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MONEY, IS THAT WHAT I WANT?: COMPETITION




Until the recent financial crisis, U.S. competition
policymakers assumed competition as generally a self-
correcting, self-initiating process. When left mostly alone by
government regulators, market forces allocate resources
efficiently to users who value them the most.' Antitrust law
"does not authorize the government (or any private party) to
seek to 'improve' competition. Instead, antitrust enforcement
seeks to deter or eliminate anticompetitive restraints."2 The
policymakers' neoclassical economic theories define "rational
behavior" as that conducted by people who "accumulate an
optimum amount of information" and "maximize their utility
from a stable set of preferences. 3  In short, their theories
assume rational actors with willpower pursuing their self-
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1. UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING GROUP, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK,
REPORT ON THE OBJECTIVES OF UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF
DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER, AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES
29 (2007), http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/
doc353.pdf.
2. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3 (2007), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report-recommendation/amc-final-
report.pdf.
3. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14
(1976).
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interest.
The neoclassical economic theories of Milton Friedman
and others associated with the University of Chicago are now
under attack. As Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch of the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently said, "[olne thing
is clear to me: the orthodox and unvarnished Chicago School
of economic theory is on life support, if it is not dead."4 He
added, "in the real world-as opposed to the worlds of
political and economic theory-markets are not perfect; ...
imperfect markets do not always correct themselves; and ...
business people do not always behave rationally."5 Likewise
in shelving the Bush administration's highly-criticized
Section 2 Report,6 the new head of the U.S. Department of
Justice's Antitrust Division rejected the report's underlying
assumption that monopoly markets are generally self-
correcting: "'The recent developments in the marketplace
should make it clear that we can no longer rely upon the
marketplace alone to ensure that competition and consumers
will be protected' . . ."I The new Assistant Attorney General
also noted how these ideologies have failed:
Americans have seen firms given room to run with the
idea that markets "self-police," and that enforcement
authorities should wait for the markets to "self-correct." It
is clear to anyone who picks up a newspaper or watches
the evening news that the country has been waiting for
this "self-correction," spurred innovation, and enhanced
consumer welfare. But these developments have not
occurred. Instead, we now see numerous markets
distorted. We are also seeing some firms fail and take
American consumers with them. It appears that a
combination of factors, including ineffective government
4. J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks at the New
York Bar Association Annual Dinner: Implications of the Financial
Meltdown for the FTC 2 (Jan. 29, 2009), http://ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/
090129financialcrisisnybarspeech.pdf.
5. Id. at 5.
6. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT (2008),
http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf.
7. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws
Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law: Antitrust Division to Apply More Rigorous
Standard With Focus on the Impact of Exclusionary Conduct on Consumers
(May 11, 2009), available at http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/
2009/245710.htm.
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regulation, ill-considered deregulatory measures, and
inadequate antitrust oversight contributed to the current
conditions.
8
So what are the financial crisis's implications for
competition policy? It has prompted U.S. policymakers to
reexamine the assumptions underlying and goals of the
prevailing neoclassical economic theories. 9  This article
addresses how behavioral economics can assist competition
authorities in recalibrating their economic and legal theories.
Although behavioral economics is a hot area in legal and
economic scholarship, the U.S. competition authorities and
community, until recently, have not embraced it. 10 I discuss
elsewhere how behavioral economics can inform merger
analysis1' as well as cartel 12 and monopolization cases. 13 This
8. Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Remarks for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: Vigorous
Antitrust Enforcement in This Challenging Era (May 12, 2009),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245777.htm.
9. John Authers, Wanted: New Model for Markets, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29,
2009, at 9.
10. But among the promising signs, FTC Commissioner Rosch has been
interested in behavioral economics' implications on competition policy. See J.
Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Remarks before the Bates White
Antitrust Conference in Washington, D.C.: Antitrust Law Enforcement: What
To Do About The Current Economics Cacophony? 10-11 (June 1, 2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/roschl090601bateswhite.pdf; Rosch, supra note 4, at
8. At its 2008 annual meeting, the American Antitrust Institute's (AAI) keynote
speaker and panelists discussed the applicability of behavioral economics to
competition policy. American Antitrust Institute, Audio Recordings from AAI's
Annual National Conference, http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/
2008conferenceaudio.ashx (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). The AAI's transition
report also recommends the empirical analysis to further this new antitrust
realism. AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE'S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE
44TH PRESIDENT 26, 172, 185, 200-01, 272-75 (2008) (discussing cartels,
mergers, and media industries). The FTC in April 2007 sponsored a conference
on behavioral economics and consumer protection issues. See Federal Trade
Commission, A Conference on Behavioral Economics and Consumer Policy,
http:J/www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/index.shtml (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
Scholars and competition authorities in the European Union are also looking at
the applicability of behavioral economics to competition policy. See, e.g., British
Institute of International and Comparative Law, http'//www.biicl.orgtcl/
clfmeetings2009 (discussing its hosting of a Competition Law Forum on
Behavioral Economics in July 2009).
11. See Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in
the Twenty-First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513 (2007) [hereinafter Stucke,
Behavioral Economists]; Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism, GLOBAL
COMPETITION POL'Y MAG., Jan. 2009.
12. Maurice E. Stucke, Am I a Price-Fixer? A Behavioral Economics
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article addresses one assumption of these neoclassical
economic theories-namely, that people pursue their self-
interest, which for this article's purpose, means people seek to
maximize their wealth and other material goals, and
generally do not care about other social goals to the extent
they conflict with personal wealth maximization. " This
assumption of self-interest has broad implications for U.S.
economic and legal policies, as it implicates, among other
things, environmental sustainability concerns, consumerism,
the problems Americans face in a debt economy, and privacy
issues.
Part I outlines how the assumption of self-interest by
neoclassical economic theories shaped U.S. competition policy
over the past thirty years. Part II surveys the behavioral
economics experiments, which show that contrary to the
Chicago School's assumption, many people do not solely
pursue their self-interest. Because the assumption of self-
interest is not descriptive, Part III asks whether it is
normative. Should citizens pursue their self-interest? Part
IV discusses the risks that may arise if governmental policies
prime persons to pursue their self-interest.
I. COMPETITION POLICY BEFORE 2007
Antitrust ideologies in the United States generally
have a thirty- to forty-year lifespan.5 Since the late 1970s,
the Chicago School's neoclassical economic theories have
shaped U.S. antitrust policy.16 The "Chicago School"
generally refers to the approach affiliated with the
Department of Economics at the University of Chicago:
In a looser sense, the term "Chicago School" is associated
Analysis of Cartels, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: A CRITICAL INTERDISCIPLINARY
STUDY OF AN INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY MOVEMENT (forthcoming 2010);
Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 443.
13. Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009
U. ILL. L. REV. 496.
14. It is beyond this article's scope to examine whether firms (which are a
collection of individuals) pursue (or should pursue) their self-interest. Just as
individual behavior may differ depending upon the norms and expectations in
that social setting, so too firm behavior may vary. Moreover, profit-
maximization, as a normative corporate theory, has many packed issues.
15. See Stucke, Behavioral Economists, supra note 11, at 537-42
(summarizing ebb and flow of antitrust policies since 1890).
16. Id. at 539-44.
[Voh:50
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with a particular brand of economics which adheres
strictly to Neoclassical price theory in its economic
analysis, "free market" libertarianism in much of its policy
work and a methodology which is relatively averse to too
much mathematical formalism and willing to forego
careful general equilibrium reasoning in favor of more
results-oriented partial equilibrium analysis. 17
Two qualifications are worth noting when describing the
Chicago School economic theories.
First, in defining the Chicago School theories as fixed
ideologies, one risks caricaturing a caricature. The beliefs of
some Chicago School theorists evolved over time."8 At times,
its theorists have clashed over competition policy 9 or in their
beliefs in market forces.20  For example, Nobel laureate
Ronald H. Coase, who is commonly associated with the
Chicago School, observed that the neoclassical economist's
consumers are not human beings, but instead "consumers
without humanity."'" He observed that the "rational utility
maximizer of economic theory bears no resemblance to the
man on the Clapham bus or, indeed, to any man (or woman)
on any bus. 22 Coase advocated for more empirical analysis of
the legal institutions that will make the competitive system
work more efficiently.23 During this financial crisis, Richard
A. Posner, another Chicago School theorist, reconsidered
some of his earlier beliefs. 24 While assuming self-interest as
17. The Chicago School, http://homepage.newschool.edu/het//schools/
chicago.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2009).
18. Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA.
L. REV. 925, 932 (1979) (noting that some ideas first advanced by one of the
School's founders, Aaron Director, "have been questioned, modified, and refined,
resulting in the emergence of a new animal: the 'diehard Chicagoan' (such as
Bork and Bowman) who has not accepted any of the suggested refinements of or
modifications in Director's original ideas").
19. William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition
Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 10-11.
20. For a recent disagreement between Judges Easterbrook and Posner, see
Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), and Jones v. Harris
Assocs., 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008).
21. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAw 3 (1988).
22. Id. at 3-4.
23. R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON.
REV. 713, 714 (1992).
24. RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND
THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009); Marcus Baram, Judge Richard Posner
Questions His Free-Market Faith in "A Failure Of Capitalism,"
20101 897
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a private virtue, 25  Judge Posner recognized how self-
interested behavior can be, at times, a public vice, and set the
stage "for an economic catastrophe."26 Because each self-
interested person will not consider the small probability that
his or her decision (in conjunction with that of her
competitors) may bring down the entire economy, Posner
argued that the government must serve as a countervailing
force to such self-interested private behavior by better
regulating financial institutions.27
Second, to say that the Chicago School dominated U.S.
competition policy, observed FTC Commissioner (and its
former Chair) William Kovacic, ignores the Harvard School
contributions of Phillip Areeda, Donald Turner, and Stephen
Breyer.28 They "had as much to do as Chicago with creating
many of the widely-observed presumptions and precautions
that disfavor intervention by U.S. courts and enforcement
agencies." 29  In a similar vein, the post-Chicago economists,
while offering different predictions under neoclassical
economic theory, for the most part, continue to employ the
theory's rationality assumption.3 °
With these two caveats in mind, the Chicago School is
HUFFINGTONPOST.COM, Apr. 20, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04
20/judge-richard-posner-disc_n_188950.html (stating that Judge Posner now
sees "the importance of government regulations; the need to strengthen the
regulatory structure by directly funding authorities rather than the current fee-
based model; the dangers of excessive executive compensation, and even express
support for the idea of changing bankruptcy law to make it easier for
homeowners who face foreclosure").
25. POSNER, supra note 24, at 107.
26. Id. at 107, 112.
27. Id. at 112-13.
28. Kovacic, supra note 19, at 80.
29. Id.
30. For example, the DOJ's top antitrust economist recently said:
Nor does the current crisis call into question the basic utility of
neoclassical microeconomics for understanding how firms behave and
how markets perform. In particular, notwithstanding great advances
in the field of behavioral economics, I have seen nothing in the past
year that would cause me to depart from the tried and true working
assumption in antitrust economics that for-profit firms generally seek
to maximize profits and that this quest usually benefits the public in a
myriad of ways. Adam Smith's teaching in this respect remains as
valid as ever.
Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for Economics, Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Competition Policy In Distressed Industries: Remarks as
Prepared For Delivery to ABA Antitrust Symposium: Competition as Public
Policy (May 13, 2009), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm.
MONEY, IS THAT WHAT I WANT?
commonly associated with certain beliefs. The "basic tenet of
the Chicago school," Posner said, is that "problems of
competition and monopoly should be analyzed using the tools
of general economic theory."3' But if this universal "general
economic theory" existed, then economists would not band
together under the labels of Chicago School, post-Chicago
School, evolutionary theorists, New Institutional Economics,
and behavioral economics, among others.32  So unlike
behavioral economics, the Chicago School's neoclassical
economic theories are derived from the assumption that
businessmen are "rational profit-maximizers."33
A. Chicago School's Assumption of Self-Interest
The assumption that people pursue their self-interest is
often associated with Adam Smith's famous statement:
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer,
or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to
their humanity, but to their self-love, and never talk to
them of our own necessities but of their advantage.
34
If, from the myriad manifestations of human behavior,
one could infer a general and dominant characteristic of
behavior, then "neoclassical economics can also be used to
explain a wide array of nonmarket and social phenomena."
35
The first assumption, "[o]ne of the hallmarks of rational
decision making, is . . . that preferences, whatever they may
be, are stable."36 If human preferences gyrate unpredictably
31. Posner, supra note 18, at 933-34.
32. As Posner recently commented on the different schools of
macroeconomic thought, "[tihe very existence of warring schools within a field is
a clue that the field is weak, however brilliant its practitioners." POSNER, supra
note 24, at 265.
33. Posner, supra note 18, at 928; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW ix (2d ed. 2001) (noting how everyone involved in antitrust agrees that
firms "should be assumed to be rational profit maximizers"). But as Posner
admitted, "[it is a curiosity, and a source of regret, that to this day [1979] very
few of [one of the Chicago School's founders Aaron] Director's ideas have been
subjected to systematic empirical examination." Posner, supra note 18, at 931
n.13.
34. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 1.2.2 (Methuen & Co. 1904) (1776).
35. Francesco Parisi, Introduction: The Legacy of Richard A. Posner and the
Methodology of Law and Economics, in THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE LAW
xii, (Francesco Parisi ed., 2000).
36. Terrence Chorvat & Kevin McCabe, Neuroeconomics and Rationality, 80
2010] 899
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(such as desiring money one day, abhorring it the next), then
human behavior is unpredictable.
Next, economists must identify (preferably empirically)
these stable preferences. Economists have not uniformly
accepted what this stable preference is; it can range from
people maximizing their expected utility, to self-interest, to
wealth maximization. 37  An economic theory with a vague
stable preference (such as utility maximization) can more
easily explain behavior ex post (e.g., people acted that way
because it maximized their utility). But the theory's
predictive value diminishes.3 1 If self-interest, for example,
encompasses everything between miserliness and
benevolence, then the theory cannot accurately predict which
specific behavior (miserliness or benevolence) will likely
dominate.
To bolster their theories' predictive abilities and simplify
their models, certain economists assume that individuals
have a stable universal preference of maximizing their
financial well-being.40 "The simple logic is that if humans are
rational maximizers of their wealth or self-interest in all their
activities, they will respond to changes in exogenous
constraints, such as laws and sanctions, in a way that can be
measured and predicted."4' So, if motivated by money, self-
interested people should uniformly respond to changes in
exogenous financial incentives and disincentives in a way
that can be measured and predicted.
Until recently, almost all economic models assumed that
people exclusively pursued their material self-interest and
did "not care about 'social' goals per se."42 Thus, "the average
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1235, 1238 (2005).
37. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law & Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1051, 1060-67 (2000) (outlining spectrum of rational choice theory).
38. Id. at 1061-66.
39. See id. at 1065.
40. ISRAEL M. KIRZNER, THE ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW: AN ESSAY IN THE
HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 51-70, 68-69 (2d ed. 1976), available at
http://www.econlib.org/library/NPDBooks/Kirzner/krzPV3.html#3.38 (describing
desire of Jevons and Edgeworth, both early users of mathematical methods in
economics, to use self-interest to turn economics into a science).
41. Parisi, supra note 35, at xii.
42. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and
Cooperation, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 271, 271 (Colin F.
Camerer et al. eds., 2004); see also Richard A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A
900 [Vol:50
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human being is about [ninety-five] percent selfish in the
narrow sense of the term."43 As Chicago School economist
George Stigler wrote, when "self-interest and ethical values
with wide verbal allegiance are in conflict, much of the time,
most of the time in fact, self-interest theory ... will win.""
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels agreed.4 5
B. Chicago School's View of Self-Correcting Markets
Few, if any, markets are characterized by perfect
competition.46  Under the Chicago School's assumptions,
Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243, 247 (1980) ("Partly
because there is no common currency in which to compare happiness, sharing,
and protection of rights, it is unclear how to make the necessary trade-offs
among these things in the design of a social system. Wealth maximization
makes the trade-offs automatically."). For criticisms of this theory that wealth
maximization does not suffer the same infirmities of measurement as
utilitarianism, see Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility and Wealth
Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 521 (1980) and Jeanne L. Schroeder, The
Midas Touch: The Lethal Effect of Wealth Maximization, 1999 WiS. L. REV. 687,
754-60.
43. Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, 7
J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 159 (1993) (quoting GORDON TULLOCK, THE VOTE MOTIVE
(1976)).
44. George J. Stigler, Economics or Ethics?, in THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HuMAN VALUES 143, 176 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1981); see also ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 119 (1978)
(reasoning profit-maximization assumption is "crucial" to the Chicago School's
theories); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (3d ed. 1986)
("The task of economics . . . is to explore the implications of assuming that man
is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions-what we shall call
his 'self-interest.'"); Posner, supra note 18, at 931 (stating that Chicago School's
theory offered "powerful simplifications," such as "rationality, profit
maximization, [and] the downward sloping demand curve"); Robert A. Prentice,
Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics, 56
VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1665 n.4 (2003).
45. Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in
BASIC WRITINGS ON POLITICS & PHILOSOPHY 9 (Lewis S. Feuer ed., 1959)
(arguing that the bourgeoisie has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties
that bound man to his "natural superiors," and has left no other bond between
man and man than naked self-interest, than callous "cash payment").
46. Perfect competition, under neoclassical economic theory, is where
"buyers and sellers are so numerous and well informed that each can act as a
price-taker, able to buy or sell any desired quantity without affecting the
market price." JOHN BLACK, A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 349 (2d ed. 2002). A
perfectly competitive market assumes transparent prices, highly elastic demand
curves, easy entry and exit, and informed producers and consumers. William J.
Kolasky, What Is Competition? A Comparison of U.S. and European
Perspectives, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 29, 31 (2004). Price equals marginal cost,
and market forces will produce the efficient level of outputs with the most
efficient techniques, using the minimum quantity of inputs. Id.
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markets are composed of rational self-interested participants
with willpower; most markets are competitive or are working
themselves to the competitive solution; mergers and vertical
arrangements among manufacturers, distributors and
retailers often generate efficiencies; and market forces likely
will redress any firm's attempt to exercise market power.47
The government is generally thought to operate outside
the free market, and must justify intervening and displacing
competition.' Government intervention is limited to clear
and sustained instances of market failure, namely
competitors' concerted efforts to curtail output: "[0]nly
explicit price fixing and very large horizontal mergers
(mergers to monopoly) [are] worthy of serious. concern."49
Even then, the government must proceed cautiously.
"Spontaneous free market forces eventually defeat, through
expansion or de novo entry, this temporary exercise of market
power" (whereby firms increase price above, and reduce
output below, competitive levels).5"
President Reagan told the nation, "government is not the
solution to our problem; government is the problem."5 1 So,
too, the Chicago School underscores how government
interference in the market, in inhibiting the market's efficient
allocation of scarce resources, likely causes greater harm than
good. The concern is that market forces may not readily
overcome governmental restraints on competition, unlike the
way in which these forces can overcome market-created
impediments. 2 Consequently, the Chicago School's greater
concern is that governmental intervention will increase the
47. See BORK, supra note 44, at 405-06; Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago
Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 257, 266
(describing Chicago School policies).
48. Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
951, 957-59 (2008).
49. Posner, supra note 18, at 933; see also UNILATERAL CONDUCT WORKING
GROUP, supra note 1, at 29; Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1701-02 (1986).
50. Stucke, supra note 48, at 958; see also Stucke, Behavioral Economists,
supra note 11, at 563-64 (discussing impact of entry assumption on antitrust
merger analysis).
51. Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981),
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres61.html.
52. Stucke, supra note 48, at 958-59 (outlining concerns of Bush
administration officials).
902 [Vol:50
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risk of false positives,5 3 and thereby chill pro-competitive
market behavior, which market forces cannot readily redress.
It has less concern about false negatives as self-interested
firms through entry or expansion presumably will correct
most market failures.
The Chicago School beliefs burned brightest during the
George W. Bush administration. In speeches54 and amicus
briefs in support of defendants,55 antitrust officials at the
DOJ often raised concerns about false positives, rarely about
false negatives. Indeed even the "diehard Chicagoan" Robert
Bork criticized the Bush administration's proposed legal
standard for evaluating monopolistic abuses as too non-
interventionist. 56 The DOJ officials did not prosecute any
53. False positives here involve finding antitrust liability for restraints that
are competitively neutral or procompetitive. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 879 (2007) (noting the risk of false
positives from its per se rules in "prohibiting procompetitive conduct the
antitrust laws should encourage"); Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) ("Mistaken inferences and the
resulting false condemnations 'are especially costly, because they chill the very
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.'" (quoting Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))).
54. See Stucke, supra note 13, at 531 n.186; Jay L. Himes, Monopoly Is
What Happens While You're Busy Making Speeches: Change We Can Believe In
Comes to the Antitrust Division, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., June 12, 2009,
at 2, available at http://www.labaton.com/_cs-upload/en/about/published/17796_
1.pdf.
55. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 26, Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109
(2009) (No. 07-512), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f237100/
237148.htm; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S.
312 (2007) (No. 05-381), available at http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f217900/
217988.htm; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioners at 25, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No. 05-1126),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f218000/218048.htm; Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2006)
(Nos. 04-805 & 04-814), available at http'/www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/
f209200/209209.htm.
56. In their amicus briefs in Trinko, several, including Judge Bork,
criticized the Bush administration's proposed legal standard as inconsistent
with the D.C. Circuit's earlier, en banc Microsoft decision. Brief for the Project
to Promote Competition and Innovation in the Digital Age as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent to the Limited Extent of Clarifying Sherman Act
Section 2 Analysis at 2, Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (No. 02-682). The Bush
administration urged the Court to adopt a no-economic-sense legal standard.
Brief for the United States & Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 15, Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (No. 02-682), available at
http'J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f201000/201048.pdf ("Where... plaintiff asserts
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monopolistic abuses, 7 and criticized foreign competition
authorities for prosecuting Microsoft for certain monopolistic
practices. 58  The DOJ repeated here and abroad the stock
phrase, "The successful competitor, having been urged to
compete, must not be turned upon when he wins."" They
advocated an antitrust hierarchy that emphasized cartel
prosecutions and deemphasized challenges of mergers and
monopolistic practices.6 °
II. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS'S SILVER LINING
The financial crisis has prompted policymakers to re-
examine fundamental issues such as the efficiency of markets
and the role of legal, social, and ethical norms in a market
economy. Antitrust officials, such as FTC Commissioner
Rosch and Assistant Attorney General Varney, have criticized
the Chicago School ideology that private market forces left
alone generally will allocate goods and services efficiently. 1
that defendant was under a duty to assist a rival.., conduct is not exclusionary
or predatory unless it would make no economic sense for the defendant but
for its tendency to eliminate or lessen competition.") (emphasis omitted);
see also Reply Brief for the United States at 2, United States v. Dentsply
Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (No. 03-4097), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f203200/203296.pdf ("Conduct is 'predatory' or
'exclusionary,' within the meaning of Section 2's prohibition against
maintaining a monopoly, if it would make no economic sense but for its
tendency to harm competition."). Under this legal standard, plaintiff must
prove that the monopolist cannot proffer any economic justification for its action
(even one whose benefit is small compared to its harm to consumers). This
standard is more deferential than the efficiencies defense in merger analysis
(where defendants must show the productive efficiency gains outweigh the
alleged allocative inefficiencies) or the structured "rule of reason" standard
where courts balance the restraints' pro- and anti-competitive effects. Bork
argued for the "rule of reason" rather than the administration's deferential
standard: "Business efficiency is an affirmative defense and, in the right
circumstances, can appropriately lead to a balancing of pro- and anticompetitive
effects." Brief for the Project to Promote Competition and Innovation, supra
note 56, at 4.
57. See Rosch, supra note 4, at 3-4; Stucke, supra note 13, at 500 n.21.
58. See Stucke, supra note 13, at 501 n.22.
59. Judge Learned Hand authored this oft-quoted line in United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). Ironically the DOJ,
which under the Bush administration never legally challenged any monopolistic
conduct, quoted this decision, in which an active DOJ successfully challenged
monopolistic conduct under section 2. For the administration's other stock
phrases, see Himes, supra note 54, at 2.
60. See Stucke, supra note 13, at 500 n.21.
61. See Rosch, supra note 4, at 4-5; Varney, supra note 8.
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This is not to say, as F.A. Hayek discussed after the Great
Depression, that a centrally-planned economy is the
remedy.62 Rather, the concern is that former policymakers
veered too close to one extreme, namely laissez-faire dogma. 63
Policymakers now must chart a new course between the
shoals of laissez-faire and socialist fundamentalism.
If the financial crisis has prompted a general
reexamination of the economic tenets of a market economy, it
makes sense for competition authorities to reevaluate the
goals of, and assumptions underlying, competition policy.
Antitrust cannot operate in a vacuum, relying on outdated,
empirically questionable assumptions (rational, self-
interested participants) and questionable goals (maximizing
output under a static price equilibrium model).
This re-examination requires more than conceding that
market participants' cognitive abilities and willpower are
limited. This introspection may cast our attention to greater
concerns about those left behind. Many Americans today are
upset over the growing disparity between the wealthy and
everyone else.64 In the 1970s, for example, the United States
was the richest country with the most educated population,
but income inequality was no higher than in most other rich
countries.65 That changed dramatically over the next thirty
years.6 6 Although the disparity between the rich and poor
has widened globally, observed the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), "nowhere has this
trend been so stark as in the United States. 67  Despite its
62. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 93-94 (Univ. of Chi. Press
2007) (1944).
63. POSNER, supra note 24, at 113, 134-35, 235 (criticizing Bush
administration's laissez-faire attitudes).
64. David Frum, The Vanishing Republican Voter, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2008, § MM (Magazine), at 50; John Thornhill, Poll Shows Wide Dislike of
Wealth Gap, FIN. TIMES ONLINE, May 18, 2008. This displeasure over the
wealth disparity exists in the EU as well. John Thornhill et al., Accent on
Egalitg: Europe Loses Patience With Its Wealthy Elite, FIN. TIMES ONLINE, June
8, 2008.
65. Thomas Lemieux, For Equality, Education Matters, SCIENCE, Sept. 26,
2008, at 1779.
66. Id.
67. Growing Unequal?: Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD
Countries, http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/47/2/41528678.pdf (last visited Jan. 9,
2010). Interestingly, the income divide between 1948 and 2007 trended upward
during Republican administrations and downward during Democratic
administrations. LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL
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high employment rate, the United States in 2005 had the
third-highest poverty rate and third-highest income gap
between the rich and poor among OECD nations (trailing
Mexico and Turkey on both measures).68 Washington, D.C.,
in fact, had the highest income disparity in the United States
in 200769 and was among the ten states and territories with
the highest poverty rate.70  The United States ranks among
the lower tier of OECD nations for earnings mobility between
generations.71 In other words, contrary to the Horatio Alger
belief,72 the poor in the United States are likely to produce
the next generation of poor. Ironically, the wealth disparity
by 2007 likely exceeded the levels reached during the robber-
baron era when the Sherman Act was promulgated.73
Utilitarian welfare economics is agnostic about
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 31 (2008).
68. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., ARE WE GROWING UNEQUAL?:
NEW EVIDENCE ON CHANGES IN POVERTY AND INCOMES OVER THE PAST 20
YEARS 2-3 (2008), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/48/56/41494435.pdf.
69. The Gini coefficient for Washington, D.C. in 2007 was 0.542, compared
to the national average of 0.467. ALEMAYEHU BISHAw & JESSICA SEMEGA, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INCOME EARNINGS, AND POVERTY: DATA FROM THE 2007
AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 9-10 (2008). The Gini index shows how much
income distribution differs from a proportionate distribution (e.g., twenty
percent of the population holding twenty percent of the income), and varies from
zero (perfect equality) to one (perfect inequality-one person controls all the
wealth). Id. at 9.
70. Id. at 21 (noting that 16.4 percent of D.C. residents were in poverty,
compared to thirteen percent of Americans overall).
71. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 68, at 7; see also
LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2008/2009 5
(2009).
72. Roland Bnabou & Jean Tirole, Belief in a Just World & Redistributive
Politics, Q. J. ECON. 699, 701-03 (2006) (noting popular perceptions of upward
mobility in U.S. and Europe).
73. Peter H. Lindert, When Did Inequality Rise in Britain and America?, 9
J. INCOME DISTRIBUTION 11, 13 (2000); see also MISHEL ET AL., supra note 71, at
3 ("Data on income concentration going back to 1913 show that the top [one
percent] of wage earners now hold [twenty-three percent] of total income, the
highest inequality level in any year on record, bar one: 1928."); Emmanuel Saez,
Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Update
with 2007 estimates) (Aug. 5, 2009), http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-
UStopincomes-2007.pdf. Senator Sherman identified this inequality of
condition, wealth, and opportunity as the greatest threat to social order, stating
that this inequality "has grown within a single generation out of the
concentration of capital into vast combinations to control production and trade
and to break down competition." 21 CONG. REC. 2455, 2460 (Mar. 21, 1890)
(statement of Sen. Sherman), reprinted in 1 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 113, 123 (Earl W. Kintner
ed., 1978).
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distributional effects from the exercise of market power.74
But under social contract theory, many would consent ex ante
to a competition policy only if a fair equality of opportunity
was maintained, and the competitive benefits (and harms) did
not disproportionately favor (and harm) particular groups.75
As the wealth gap widens in the United States, those left
behind have less incentive to perpetuate the prevailing
competition policies. Recently reflecting on the financial
crisis, Peter Sutherland, chairman of British Petroleum and
Goldman Sachs International, compared the social safety net
support in Denmark with that of Anglo-Saxon economies: "I
do think we need to reflect on a certain culture of excess."76
A. Behavioral Economics Conception of Strong Reciprocity
Neoclassical economic theory assumes individuals as
rational, self-interested beings with perfect willpower. 17
Behavioral economics, in contrast, uses facts and methods
from other social sciences such as psychology and sociology to
understand the limits of this assumption. 7  Testing this
74. Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: The
Other Path, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 211, 219-20 (2007) (stating that
"proponents of this perspective on aggregate efficiency or wealth do not grapple
with the deontological questions of power and how opportunity is distributed").
75. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 242-46 (rev. ed. 2005).
76. Harry Eyres, Lunch with the FT: Peter Sutherland, FIN. TIMES ONLINE,
Jan. 3, 2009; see also Leo Hindery, Obama Must Act to Curb Executive Greed,
FIN. TIMES ONLINE, June 24, 2009 (stating that former AT&T executive decried
income disparity as beyond an "ethical embarrassment" but a "[thirty]-year-old
flesh-eating bacterium that is gnawing away at our economy").
77. See BECKER, supra note 3, at 14.
78. For interesting surveys of the behavioral economics research, see
generally GEORGE A. AKERLOF & ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: How
HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL
CAPITALISM (2009); DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN
FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS (2008); MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE (Herbert Gintis et al. eds.,
2005); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 42; Stefano
DellaVigna, Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field, 47 J. OF ECON.
LIT. 315 (2009); Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of
Law, 4 HAIFA L. REV. 237 (2008); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1998); Prentice, supra note
44. For a broader survey of literature attacking the conventional economic
theories, see generally ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: THE
RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS AND
SOCIETY (2007).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
rationality assumption in actual experiments,79 behavioral
economists find that people systematically and predictably do
not behave under certain scenarios as neoclassical economic
theory predicts.8 0  Instead, actual human behavior is
characterized as bounded rationality, willpower, and self-
interest. Individuals may react differently depending on how
the choice is phrased or elect suboptimal outcomes based on
certain heuristics."' Neither the state nor private economic
agents are endowed with perfect cognitive abilities, but adopt
a "satisficing and adaptive behaviour." 2 Individuals lack
willpower and knowingly act contrary to their long-term
interests (for example by overeating, imbibing too much
alcohol, and smoking). And, as this article discusses, people
can be far more charitable and fair than their theoretical self-
interested counterparts.
Even apart from behavioral economics, the neoclassical
economic theories' assumption of rational self-interested
behavior suffers several flaws.
First, the model of perfect competition itself has
problems, including its incompleteness; it has "little to say
about productive and dynamic efficiency."83
Second, even before behavioral economics, individuals
adhering to religious or ethical norms rejected the
assumption that people solely pursue their self-interest. As
C.S. Lewis said, homogeneity in motivation inheres in vices
79. Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past,
Present, Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 42, at 7.
80. Tor, supra note 78, at 242-43.
81. DellaVigna, supra note 78, at 320-65 (surveying the empirical evidence
from the field on various biases and heuristics); Stucke, Behavioral Economists,
supra note 11, at 527-28 (identifying several identified biases and heuristics).
82. Frangois Moreau, The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics, 28
CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 847, 851 (2004).
83. Stucke, supra note 48, at 967 (footnote omitted). If the model's
assumptions were true, then human behavior should be easier to predict. A
state planner arguably could model any scenario using the hypothetical profit-
maximizer and centrally plan the same outcome. Execution of economic goals
might, if the rationality assumptions are correct, be equally or perhaps more
efficient, through central planning. It is precisely the complexity and
unpredictability of the competitive process, the diversity of human knowledge,
and the variety of conditions intrinsic to or affecting markets, such as ethical
and cultural norms, technology, production, and service norms that necessitate
against a centrally-planned economy. An inverse relationship exists between
the two concepts: the greater the infirmities of the assumptions underlying
perfect competition, the less practicable a centrally-planned economy becomes.
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rather than virtues A4 The many ways to live a virtuous life
enrich our world; the tyrants' pursuit of their narrow self-
interest only deadens it. a5 Motivated by religious or social
norms of fairness, many people are compassionate and
cooperative even when it does not maximize their wealth.
Third, even before behavioral economics, Adam Smith
and other economists rejected this assumption of self-
interest. 86 Even Posner recognized that economic analysis
"long ago abandoned the model of hyperrational, emotionless,
unsocial, supremely egoistic, nonstrategic man (or woman).""
Some economists today acknowledge other-regarding
behavior.88 The issue for them is under what circumstances,
and to what degree, do people purse their self-interest. Yet as
economist Matthew Rabin observed, many economists,
including experimental economists, still cling to the
assumption of self-interest.89
The behavioral economics experiments confirm that
human motivation is more nuanced and complex than the
simplistic assumption of self-interest; but they also measure
when, and to what degree, people pursue or sacrifice their
self-interest. The recent experiments in bargaining settings,
as Samuel Bowles summarizes, systematically show "that
84. C.S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 175 (rev. ed. 1952) ("How monotonously
alike all the great tyrants and conquerors have been: how gloriously different
are the saints."). For a beautifully written account of the diversity of several
saints' lives, and their lives' impact on one Jesuit priest, see JAMES MARTIN, SJ,
My LIFE WITH THE SAINTS (2006).
85. See ST. FRANCIS DE SALES, INTRODUCTION TO THE DEVOUT LIFE 34
(Vantage Spiritual Classics 2002) (1876) (noting "how all alike are hateful,
restless, wild: see how they despise one another, and only pretend to an unreal
self-seeking love"); CORNELIUS TACITUS, THE ANNALS & THE HISTORIES 139
(Moses Hadas ed., Alfred John Church & William Jackson Brodribb trans.,
2003) (describing his gloomy task in presenting "in succession the merciless
biddings of a tyrant, incessant prosecutions, faithless friendships, the ruin of
innocence, the same causes issuing in the same results, and [being] everywhere
confronted by a wearisome monotony in my subject matter").
86. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 3 (1759) ("How
selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his
nature which interest him in the fortune of others and render their happiness
necessary to him though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing
it."); see also Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977).
87. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the
Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1552 (1998).
88. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 37, at 1134; Matthew Rabin, A Perspective
on Psychology and Economics, 46 EUR. ECON. REv. 657, 665 (2002).
89. Rabin, supra note 88, at 667.
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substantial fractions of most populations adhere to moral
rules, willingly give to others, and punish those who offend
standards of appropriate behavior, even at a cost to
themselves and with no expectation of material reward."90
This "strong reciprocity" in human behavior entails "a
predisposition to cooperate with others and to punish those
who violate the norms of cooperation, at personal cost, even
when it is implausible to expect that these costs will be repaid
either by others or at a later date."91
Psychological and experimental economic evidence shows
that people care about treating others, and being treated,
fairly. 92 For example, employers may not reduce wages
during times of deflation as workers perceive this wage
reduction as unfair, and retaliate by working less hard.93 So
rather than self-interest, employers may appeal to fairness
concerns. 94 Likewise, in the behavioral experiments, people
care about resources being equitably distributed, not solely
about resources going to those with the greater use. 95
Neoclassical economic theory predicts free riding when
people are confronted with a public good. Instead, many
people in public goods experiments do not free ride at all, or
to the extent predicted under the neoclassical economic
theories: "[P]eople have a tendency to cooperate until
experience shows that those with whom they're interacting
are taking advantage of them."96 Especially when given the
90. Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-interested Citizens May
Undermine "The Moral Sentiments". Evidence from Economic Experiments,
SCIENCE, June 20, 2008, at 1605, 1606.
91. Herbert Gintis et al., Explaining Altruistic Behavior in Humans, 24
EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 153, 154 (2003). These authors argue that "the
evolutionary success of our species and the moral sentiments that have led
people to value freedom, equality, and representative government are
predicated upon strong reciprocity and related motivations that go beyond
inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism." Id.
92. Jolls et al., supra note 78, at 1479.
93. Herbert Gintis et al., Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: Origins,
Evidence, and Consequences, in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS:
THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE, supra note 78, at 3, 32.
94. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 729 (1986) ("A central
concept in analyzing the fairness of actions in which a firm sets the terms of
future exchanges is the reference transaction, a relevant precedent that is
characterized by a reference price or wage, and by a positive reference profit to
the firm.").
95. Rabin, supra note 88, at 665.
96. RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
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option of punishing free riders, even when it involves a
personal cost, people cooperate at much higher levels than
neoclassical economic theory predicts. 97
Our "strong reciprocity" to cooperate with others and
punish unfair behavior is also displayed in the Ultimatum
Game. 98 In this behavioral economics experiment, a subject
is given some money and must offer a second subject some
portion thereof.99 If the second subject accepts the offer, both
can keep the money."' If the second subject rejects the offer,
neither keeps the money. 10 ' Neoclassical economic theory
predicts people will offer the smallest amount-one penny. 102
If everyone acts in their self-interest, the first subject would
selfishly want as much money as possible; the second subject
recognizes that a penny is better than nothing. 03 But actual
experiments of this Ultimatum Game in over twenty
countries show the contrary. Most offer significantly more
than the nominal amount (ordinarily forty to fifty percent of
the total amount available) and recipients about half the time
reject nominal amounts (less than twenty percent of the total
amount available).' 4 Consequently, most receivers in this
game forgo wealth to punish unfair offers, and offerors
generally offer more than the nominal profit-maximizing
amount. 105
These results cannot be explained as the participants'
maximizing their reputation or goodwill; the same results
occur in anonymous one-shot games. 106 Even when the game
is repeated ten times to allow for learning, similar results
follow. 1 7 In the Dictator Game, a variation of the Ultimatum
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 14 (1992); see also Prentice, supra note 44, at
1698.
97. Gintis et al., supra note 93, at 15.
98. Id. at 11-13.
99. Id. at 11-12.
100. Id. at 12.
101. Id.
102. Jolls et al., supra note 78, at 1490.
103. Id.
104. THALER, supra note 96, at 21-25; Jolls et al., supra note 78, at 1492-93;
Werner Guth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 371-74, 375 tbls.4-5 (1982); Daniel Kahneman et
al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285, S291 tbl.2
(1986).
105. Stucke, Behavioral Economists, supra note 11, at 530 n.79.
106. Jolls et al., supra note 78, at 1492.
107. Id. at 1490.
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Game where the receivers must accept any offer, people still
share, although the amount shared may vary depending on
certain conditions, such as whether the recipients stand up
and give a few facts about themselves or are identified as a
charity.,08
Evidence of strong reciprocity and conditional
cooperation is also found in other behavioral experiments. In
one Prisoner's Dilemma game, for example, test subjects A
and B each possess £10, which they can either keep or
transfer to the other person. 109 Upon transfer, the recipient
gets triple the amount.110 So if A and B decide to keep their
money, each earns £10; if both decide to transfer, each earns
£30.111 If one transfers her money, but the other does not,
then the sharer loses out. She gets nothing, while the
recipient gets £40 (the £30 transferred, plus the £10 kept).
Neoclassical economic theory predicts that self-interested
players will keep their £10 and not cooperate. 112  Instead
many test subjects cooperate in these situations. 113
Not everyone, of course, is trusting. In many behavioral
economics experiments, some behave selfishly, and other
individuals (the conditional cooperators) may incur costs to
punish this selfish behavior. 114 When selfish individuals and
strongly-reciprocal individuals interact, the experiment's
outcome can depend on each person's perception of the other
person as sharing or selfish,11 the rules of the game,116 and
108. Nava Ashraf et al., Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 131, 135-36 (2005).
109. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Economics of Strong Reciprocity, in
MORAL SENTIMENTS & MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
COOPERATION IN EcONOMIC LIFE, supra note 78, at 151, 164-65.




114. Id. at 155.
115. Cooperative individuals in the trust and public goods experiments will
act selfishly if they feel they are being taken advantaged of and no penalty
provision exists to punish selfish behavior. Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 109,
at 167. If both believe the other will share, both will share. Id. If both believe
the other is selfish, neither will share. Id. Even persons prone to sharing will
not share if they believe that the other will defect. Id. Thus, the suboptimal
equilibrium (defect, defect) arises. Id.
116. If the game's rules are changed so that the selfish players must decide
first, the equilibrium shifts. Id. If the first-mover knows that her partner is
naturally cooperative, the selfish player will opt for cooperation as the payoff is
greater. Id.
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institutional mechanisms to punish behavior perceived as
selfish or unfair. Neoclassical economic theory predicts that
the punishment mechanism, if it involves costs to the
punisher, should not affect the outcome.'17 But as individuals
forgo profits to punish unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game,
so too in the behavioral public goods and trust experiments,
they incur costs to punish free riding."' In fact, the
punishment mechanism has a positive effect in deterring free
riding; in repeat games, contributions steadily increase until
nearly all participants contribute one hundred percent of
their endowment. "19
Neoclassical economic theory predicts that financial
incentives should motivate, and penalties should deter,
behavior. 120 So if law firm associates are disgruntled in
working longer hours (and other viable job prospects exist),
reward them with higher bonuses. But suppose these
associates are running a 5K road race for a local charity. Can
one induce them to run faster by offering them a monetary
prize?
People, as the behavioral economic experiments show,
are not solely motivated by, and may act contrary to, self-
interest. We are also motivated by praise as well as "shame,
guilt, empathy, or sensitivity to social sanction." 21 At times,
financial incentives and ethical norms are complements. But
in most behavioral experiments, financial rewards that
displace social, moral, or ethical norms decrease (not
increase) motivation or the likelihood of achieving the desired
results. 22  Indeed, mixing financial norms into ethical or
social settings may be counterproductive.
Professor Dan Ariely, for example, did several
117. Because punishment is costly for the punisher (which the punisher does
not recoup through cooperation), self-interested players would not punish. Id. at
169. Recognizing this, self-interested players will not contribute to public goods
games. Thus, with or without costly punishment mechanisms, the predicted
response under neoclassical economic theory is zero contributions. Id. at 170.
118. Id. at 169.
119. Id. at 169-70. In the last few periods of the multi-period games, the
actual rate of punishment is low. Id. at 170.
120. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Incentives, Punishment, and Behavior, in
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note 42, at 572.
121. See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Origins of Human Cooperation, in
GENETIC AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 429, 432-33 (Peter
Hammerstein ed., 2003).
122. Bowles, supra note 90, at 1605-06.
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experiments when social and market norms clashed. 123
Participants were divided into three groups. Each group
performed the same mundane task. 124 One group (the social-
norm group) was not compensated, but asked to undertake
the task as a favor. 125  In the first study, the social-norm
group outperformed the group whose members received five
dollars of compensation for the task, which outperformed the
group whose members received fifty cents for the task. 126 In
the second study, the two groups did not receive cash, but a
gift of comparable value (a Snickers bar for the fifty-cent
group and a box of Godiva chocolate for the five-dollar
group).127 The two groups performed as hard as the social-
norm group. 28  When in the third study the gifts were
monetized to the two groups-a "[fifty]-cent Snickers bar" or a
"[five dollar]-box of Godiva chocolates"-these two groups
again devoted less effort than the social-norm group. 129
Other behavioral experiments show the flipside-the way
in which appealing to ethical or religious norms can deter
unwanted self-interested behavior.'30 At times, highlighting
123. ARIELY, supra note 78, at 69-74.
124. Id. at 70.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 70-71.
127. Id. at 72.
128. Id. at 72-73.
129. ARIELY, supra note 78, at 73. Similarly more lawyers volunteered to
donate their services for free to needy retirees than when they were offered a
relatively small amount (thirty dollars per hour). Id. at 71. Voluntary blood
donations in Britain declined sharply when a policy of paying donors was
instituted alongside the voluntary sector. Gintis et al., supra note 93, at 20.
Likewise Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini did an experiment with high school
students who collected donations for a public purpose in Israel's annually
publicized "donation days." Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 120, at 573. One
group of high schoolers was given a pep talk of the importance of these
donations. Id. at 579. A second group, in addition to the pep talk, was promised
one percent of the amount collected to be paid from an independent source. Id.
A third group was promised an even greater financial incentive (ten percent of
the amount collected). Id. Under neoclassical economic theory, the third group,
motivated by the greater financial incentive, should collect the most donations.
Instead, the groups promised the one percent and ten percent shares collected a
lower average amount ($153.67 and $219.33, respectively) than the group not
financially compensated but given only the pep talk ($238.60). Id. at 578-80.
130. In one experiment, MIT students, divided into three groups, were
financially rewarded for correct answers on a math test. ARIELY, supra note 78,
at 211. The control group, which could not cheat, solved on average three
problems; the second group could cheat as they self-reported the number of
right answers and reported solving on average 5.5 problems on the same test.
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an ethical or religious norm more effectively deters unwanted
behavior than other penalties. 131  One experiment involved
citizens preparing their income tax statements. 132  It
attempted to compare the effect of penalties with that of
appeals to conscience. For the penalty group, the emphasis
was on the severity of possible jail sentences and the
likelihood that tax violators would be apprehended. The
"conscience" group was exposed to questions "accentuating
moral reasons for compliance with tax law."133  The
conscience appeal, overall, had a stronger effect on income
reported than did the threat of penalties. 1 3  The study's
results gave some evidence that, although the threat of
punishment can increase tax compliance (particularly among
the wealthiest respondents), appeals to conscience
(particularly among the college-educated respondents) can be
more effective than threatening penalties for securing tax
compliance. 135
At times, a voluntary, community-regulated system of
restraints is more effective than a financial penalty; the
monetary penalty "may be perceived as being unkind or
hostile action (especially if the fine is imposed by agents who
have an antagonistic relationship with group members)."3 6
Id. at 212. The third group, like the second group, could cheat, but they signed
at the beginning of the test the statement "I understand that this study falls
under the MIT honor system." Id. MIT does not, in fact, have an honor code.
The third group self-reported on average three problems, the same number as
the control group, which could not cheat. Id. at 212-13. In another experiment,
a group before being administered a test was asked to write down as many of
the Ten Commandments as they could recall. Id. at 207. That group could, but
did not, cheat (compared to the group asked to recite beforehand ten books they
read in high school, which did cheat). Id. at 207-08. Thus reminding
participants of moral or ethical norms just before the temptation to cheat
proved effective. These behavioral experiments support Federal Rule of
Evidence 603's policy that trial witnesses immediately before testifying take an
oath or affirmation "calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress
the witness' mind with the duty" to testify truthfully. FED. R. EVID. 603.
131. ARIELY, supra note 78, at 207-08.
132. Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 274, 283-99 (1967).
133. Id. at 287-88.
134. Id. at 291.
135. Id. at 299; see also Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to
Show the Power & Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 581, 615-17 (2002) (noting that perceptions of fairness and
justice may in certain situations play a greater role in motivating behavior than
incentives or penalties).
136. Gintis et al., supra note 93, at 20.
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Professors Gneezy and Rustichini considered what impact, if
any, a monetary fine had on curbing undesired behavior-
namely, parents who were picking up their children late from
private day care centers. 137 These day care centers originally
had no rule governing parents who picked up their children
after 4:00 p.m.; generally, a teacher had to wait with the
tardy parent's child. 138 A fine on tardiness was thereafter
introduced in some of the day care centers, which, under
neoclassical economic theory, should decrease the incidences
of tardiness.139 Instead, the average number of late-arriving
parents increased for these day care centers. 140  Moreover,
after the fine was canceled, the average number of late-
arriving parents did not return to the pre-fine levels.14 1 For
the control group, on the other hand, for whom no fine was
imposed, there was no significant shift of late-arriving
parents during this period, and fewer parents reported late in
these day care centers than in the day care centers with the
fine. 4 1 So why did the monetary penalty increase the
undesired behavior? Perhaps, as the authors conclude,
parents before were intrinsically motivated to pick up their
children on time. 143 The introduction of the fine monetized
that lateness into an additional service, offered at a relatively
low price. 144
B. Competition Policies, Like Other Governmental Policies,
Can Affect Human Behavior
Individuals are not always charitable or selfish. As
Subpart A discussed, many factors, such as the way questions
or experiments are framed, affect human behavior. An
important factor in the Prisoner's Dilemma experiment, for
example, is whether the game is framed in "cooperation"
terms (individuals are more likely to cooperate) than in
"competitive" terms. 145  Using market terminology, such as
"exchange," to describe an experiment reduces fair-minded
137. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 120, at 581-86.
138. Id. at 582.
139. Id. at 572, 582-83.
140. Id. at 584.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 120, at 586.
144. Id.
145. Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 109, at 165.
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behavior. 146
At times, reminding individuals about money can lead to
selfish, less desirable behavior. 147 One series of experiments
involved nonconscious reminders of the concept of money. 148
Compared to the control group, participants primed with
money were more independent in their work, but less likely to
seek help from others, less willing to spend time helping
others, and stingier when asked to donate to a worthy
cause. 149  Those primed with money in get-acquainted
conversations put more physical distance between themselves
than those in the control group. 5 ° Unlike the people primed
with a control condition (poster showing a seascape or flower
garden), participants primed with money (their desk faced a
poster showing various currency denominations) chose more
individually-focused leisure experiences and preferred to
work alone rather than with a peer on a task.'5'
146. Bowles, supra note 90, at 1606.
147. Some empirical studies find students majoring in economics are
motivated more by self-interest than others, although other studies show the
contrary. See, e.g., Anthony M. Yezer et al., Does Studying Economics
Discourage Cooperation? Watch What We Do, Not What We Say or How We Play,
10 J. ECON. PERSP. 177, 180-81 (1996) (showing that in an experiment of
leaving "lost" letters with ten dollars in cash in classrooms, there was a higher
rate of return (fifty-six percent) for thirty-two letters left in upper-economics
classes than thirty-two letters left in upper-level classes in other disciplines
(thirty-one percent)); T.D. Stanley & Ume Tran, Economics Students Need Not
Be Greedy: Fairness and the Ultimatum Game, 27 J. SOCIO-ECON. 657, 660
(1998) (showing that in Ultimatum Game conducted at small liberal arts
college, with about 1000 undergraduate students, the seven economic majors
were less motivated by self-interest than the nine other students in their
experiment).
148. The participants, for example, had to descramble four of the five words
(e.g., "high a salary desk paying") into a sensible phrase (e.g., "a high-paying
salary"). Kathleen D. Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money,
SCIENCE, Nov. 17, 2006, at 1154. Those primed with money had to descramble
phrases involving money. Id.
149. Id.; see also Benedict Carey, Just Thinking About Money Can Turn the
Mind Stingy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at F6.
150. Vohs et al., supra note 148, at 1156.
151. Id. In another experiment, the participants played the board game
Monopoly. Id. at 1155. After seven minutes, the game was cleared leaving the
participants with one of three different amounts of Monopoly play money:
$4000 (high-money condition), $200 (low-money condition), and no money
(control condition). Id. For the high- and low-money condition participants,
their play money remained in view for the rest of the experiment. Id. Each
participant in the high-money group was asked to imagine a future with
abundant finances. Id. Those in the low-money group were asked to imagine a
future with strained finances. Id. Those in the control group (which received
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C. Criticisms of Behavioral Economics
While amused by the behavioral economics literature,
some question its applicability to individual (or firm) behavior
in the marketplace. One criticism is that behavioral
economics focuses on certain persons not representative of the
total population (namely university students) in an artificial
setting (namely lab experiments)." 2 So naturally students'
decisions in experimental games with small financial stakes
could differ from real market behavior with often greater
financial stakes.
This criticism perhaps was valid for earlier behavioral
experiments involving university students (and at times
professors), but today's behavioral economics literature
includes field experiments and data from actual market
transactions. 153  For example, researchers expanded the
Ultimatum Game experiment to fifteen small-scale economies
from twelve countries on four continents.5 4  These group
members, like the university students, reciprocated and did
not offer the nominal amount. Nor do high financial stakes
eliminate these heuristics and biases. 15 5
A second criticism of behavioral economics is that the
neoclassical economic theories, while imperfect, are a good
approximation. Many firms benefit from the division of labor,
and accordingly train or hire experts to capture the benefits
from specialized knowledge. Market participants typically
no money at the end) were asked about their plans for tomorrow. Id. An
accident was staged: one confederate to the experiment (who did not know the
participant's priming condition) spilled twenty-seven pencils before the
participant. Id. Participants in the high-money condition on average gathered
fewer pencils than the low-money participants, which gathered fewer pencils
than the control group. Id.
152. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 87, at 1566.
153. For one recent survey of the literature, see DellaVigna, supra note 78, at
320-65. For an earlier informative examination of the criticisms of behavioral
economics and responses thereto, see Prentice, supra note 44.
154. Gintis et al., supra note 91, at 154. The groups studied included (i)
three foraging groups (the Hadza of East Africa, the Au and Gnau of Papua
New Guinea, and the Lamalera of Indonesia), (ii) six slash-and-burn
horticulturists (the Achd, Machiguenga, Quichua, and Achuar of South America
and the Tsimane and Orma of East Africa), (iii) four nomadic herding groups
(the Turguud, Mongols, and Kazakhs of Central Asia, and the Sangu of East
Africa), and (iv) two sedentary, small-scale agricultural societies (the Mapuche
of South America and Zimbabwe farmers in Africa). Id. at 158.
155. Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for
Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1468-69 (2003).
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are repeat players who learn from and correct their mistakes.
Firms and their employees have greater incentives to be
rational, as they often are subject to competitive pressures.156
Those behaving irrationally eventually exit the market.
Thus, as Posner opines, "unusually 'fair'" people will avoid or
be forced out of "roughhouse activities-including highly
competitive businesses, trial lawyering, and the academic rat
race."'57 Basically the fair-minded are relegated to monopoly
industries, government-subsidized work or inactivity, and
religious organizations that do not compete for converts.
No doubt people can learn from their mistakes and
improve their reasoning and willpower. For example,
frequent and more experienced sports cards traders display
less of an endowment effect 158 for sports cards (such as
baseball trading cards) than for other items such as
chocolates and mugs. 159 But one must distinguish between
bounded rationality/willpower and bounded self-interest.
Perfect rationality and willpower, while not descriptive, are
at least defensible norms. Who would not want better
willpower and reasoning capabilities? But as the next part
addresses, self-interest is not a well-accepted norm.
A third criticism is that behavioral economics, while
identifying the predictive shortcomings of neoclassical
economic theory, does not provide policymakers an
alternative unifying theory. 160  But this criticism
misconstrues the purpose of behavioral economics. Its
purpose is to augment, not displace, neoclassical economic
156. See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism & Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 133, 140-41, 144-46 (2006) (arguing how consumers outside the lab have
stronger incentives to reduce error, which they can through experience).
157. Posner, supra note 87, at 1570.
158. The endowment effect occurs when we demand much more to give up
and sell an object (such as baseball's World Series tickets) than what we would
be willing to pay to acquire that object. THALER, supra note 96, at 70-74.
159. John A. List, Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from
the Marketplace, 72 ECONOMETRICA 615, 615 (2004); John A. List, Does Market
Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q. J. ECON. 41 (2003). But the
fact that some individuals are less susceptible to a particular bias does not
mean that they are immune from all biases and heuristics.
160. Posner, supra note 87, at 1559-60; cf. Mark Kelman, Behavioral
Economics as Part of a Rhetorical Duet: A Response to Jolls, Sunstein, and
Thaler, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1577, 1586 (1998) (noting how behavioral economics
.can better be seen as a series of particular counterstories, formed largely in
parasitic reaction to the unduly self-confident predictions of rational choice
theorists, than as an alternative general theory of human behavior").
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theory by providing more realistic assumptions of human
behavior, such as incurring personal costs to punish unfair
behavior. 161
A fourth criticism involves behavioral economics' policy
implications. Rational self-interested persons with perfect
willpower often can take care of themselves in the
marketplace. But in relaxing that assumption of rationality,
one runs the risk of inviting too much governmental
regulation under the guise of paternalistically protecting
"irrational" citizens. This paternalism thereby minimizes our
incentives to improve our cognitive abilities and willpower.
Also, if private market participants are predictably irrational,
so too are governmental agents. While market forces provide
greater incentives for private market participants to improve
their willpower and rationality, government agents at times
undertake anticompetitive actions because of weaker
incentives to avoid mistakes, political myopia, the lack of
direct accountability to voters, and regulatory capture. Thus,
consumers may be worse off when the government intervenes
to cure what it perceives as irrational behavioral.162
Government paternalism at times can cause suboptimal
outcomes. But one cannot infer from these anecdotes that
governmental paternalism always reduces consumer welfare.
Before assessing the policy implications of irrational market
behavior and the benefits and risks of various governmental
policies and inaction, one must first examine the factual
context in which bounded rationality arises. The policy
implications differ, for example, when (i) a competition policy
assumes that private market participants behave rationally
when they systemically behave irrationally under certain
settings, (ii) rational firms exploit consumers' irrationalities,
or (iii) rational firms know of consumer irrationality but do
not (or cannot) eliminate it. 163
161. Jolls et al., supra note 78, at 1479.
162. For more on behavioral economics' policy implications on the role of
government, see generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 78; Glaeser, supra
note 156, at 133; Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99
Nw. U. L. REV. 1245 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003); and Colin
Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the
Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003).
163. For example, rational investors may know that other investors are
acting irrationally (such as buying a company's stock on hope that past price
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III. SHOULD SELF-INTEREST BE THE NORM?
Part II showed that people do not predictably and
uniformly pursue their self-interest. As the behavioral
economics literature shows, many people generally care about
treating others, and being treated, fairly. Moreover, legal,
social, and ethical norms as well as other factors, such as
market mechanisms to punish perceived selfish behavior, can
affect human behavior. Because human behavior can vary,
this part asks whether self-interest should be the norm. Is
self-interested behavior the desired end, or the necessary
means to some higher end, such as maximizing social
welfare? Advocates of self-interest must now debate
theologians, philosophers, political scientists, and others in
espousing how people ought to act. They must answer why
self-interest is an ideal that captures most or all the relevant
ideals important to society, or the principal and necessary
means to some higher end, such as happiness.
A. In Defense of Self-Interest
As John Kenneth Galbraith commented: "The modern
conservative is engaged in one of man's oldest exercises in
moral philosophy; that is, the search for a superior moral
justification for selfishness . "..."164 Greed and selfishness are
repackaged as virtues. One presupposition of neoclassical
economic theory is that the "natural laws of the market are in
essence good ... and necessarily work for the good, whatever
may be true of the morality of individuals.""1 5 Society should
encourage self-interest, which drives markets toward more
efficient outcomes. The government need not intervene
because rational market participants primed to pursue their
self-interest will prevent or quickly cure most market failures
increases will continue with future price increases). The rational trader may
want to short the company's stock (and thereby make money when the price of
the stock declines). The rational investor, however, does not know when the
bubble will end and it, due to investor pressure, may be subject to short-term
horizons. Instead, rational traders may actually prolong the speculation by
seeking short-term gains and waiting to short the stock when it appears more
likely that the market appears ripe for a downturn.
164. MICHAEL JACKMAN, CROWN'S BOOK OF POLITICAL QUOTATIONS: OVER
2500 LIVELY QUOTES FROM PLATO To REAGAN 31 (1982).
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in the form of arbitrage. 166
But few economists defend self-interest on normative
grounds. 167  The Chicago School economists, likewise, do not
endorse self-interest as a normative theory. Bork defended
his School's definition of rationality on its superior descriptive
qualities, not on normative grounds.168 Posner characterized
earlier economists' attempts to defend wealth maximization
as a societal goal and to make economics a source of moral
guidance as "doomed efforts." 69 Instead, the economist's role
is prescriptive.'70
Others may argue for a weaker form of self-interest,
namely to maximize individual liberty to choose between
charity and selfishness. This weaker form of self-interest
could easily be characterized as individualism, whereby the
goal is to widen the field for the exercise of personal choice.
Compared with a totalitarian regime dictating what is
desirable, the weaker form of self-interest is, of course,
preferable. To press the issue further, why not make self-
interest as the norm? Indeed unless one adopts a strict
rationalist model, one cannot avoid this issue.
A rationalist model is consistent with the weaker form of
self-interest. People, through reason, alter their behavior to
166. JUSTIN Fox, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK,
REWARD, AND DELUSION ON WALL STREET 192 (2009); ANDREI SCHLEIFER,
INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 2-5 (2000).
167. Robert Skidelsky, How to Rebuild a Shamed Subject, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
6, 2009, at 11 ("Ever since modern economics started in the 18th century it has
presented itself as a predictive discipline, akin to a natural science."); LUDWIG
VON MISES, HuMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 242 (Fox & Wilkes
1996) (1949) ("Economics is not intent upon pronouncing value judgments.");
Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of
Property Law, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1688 (2003) (criticizing law and
economics scholars as typically and conveniently assuming that although ideal
preferences are superior to actual preferences as a criterion of well-being, there
usually will be no significant empirical differences in applying the two
measures); Eyal Zamir, The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 VA. L. REV. 229, 251
(1998) (noting that economic analysis ordinarily assumes rationality as
descriptive, rather than normative or logical).
168. BORK, supra note 44, at 120-21.
169. Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1670 (1998).
170. Id. ("What the economist can say, which is a lot but not everything, is
that if a society values prosperity (or freedom or equality), these are the various
policies that will conduce to that goal, and these are the costs associated with
each. The economist cannot take the final step and say that a society's ultimate
goal should be growth, equality, happiness, survival, conquest, stasis, social
justice, or what have you.").
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progress toward the desired end. Rational individuals
determine which goals (such as fame, fortune, or power) are
the proper end, and the means of attaining that end. 171
Rationality, for Aristotle, reflected deliberations on the end
(happiness), and the means to attain that end (living a
virtuous life).' 72 Behavior motivated by wealth maximization
is neither rational, in accord with a virtuous life, nor likely to
lead to happiness, but rather an appetite devoid of
rationality. 173  So as their cognitive abilities and willpower
improve, people will choose the virtuous life. 174  Thus,
dictating self-interest as the norm is unnecessary. Under this
model, the objective is to enable individuals to make the
wisest choices by affording them the liberty and ability to
improve their cognitive abilities and willpower. 175
Responding to the rationalist model, Dostoyevsky
remarked, "[tihe trouble with man is that he's stupid.
Phenomenally stupid."'76 Some people persist in desiring
rather than reasoning. Contrary to the rationalist model, but
milder than Dostoyevsky's conception, the social intuitionist
model recognizes human capacity for deliberative, slow
reasoning, but posits that many judgments generally appear
in consciousness automatically and effortlessly. 177  More
active moral reasoning typically arises ex post to justify our
moral judgment, and our moral judgments are highly attuned
to group norms and the moral judgments of our family,
friends, and peers. 17  Even for Aristotle, knowledge about
the proper means was insufficient."' Virtue arises from
171. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 37-60 (Roger Crisp ed., 2d ed. 2002)
172. Id. at 3-23.
173. Id. at 60-65.
174. Id. at 23.
175. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13, 61-62, 86-99 (Barnes &
Noble Books 2004) (1859) (demanding liberty of conscience, tastes, and
pursuits); George J. Stigler, The Intellectual and the Market Place, 2 NEW
INDIVIDUALIST REV. (1962), http://oll.libertyfund.orgtitle/2136/195332 ("man
should be free within the widest possible limits of other men's limitations on his
beliefs and actions").
176. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, NOTES FROM THE UNDERGROUND 109 (Andrew
R. MacAndrew trans., Signet Classic 1980) (1961).
177. Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 818-19
(2001); see also Matthew Rabin, Psychology and Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV.
1449, 1450-52 (2003); Kahneman, supra note 155, at 1450.
178. Haidt, supra note 177, at 818-19.
179. ARISTOTLE, supra note 171, at 23.
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routinely exercising the desired behavior. By cultivating and
habituating the desired behavior through repetition, one
more likely responds similarly in future decisions: "So too we
become just by doing just actions, temperate by temperate
actions, and courageous by courageous actions."'8 0
Consequently, under a rationalist or social intuitionist
model, one does not simply ponder whether self-interest or
compassion is the proper choice. Rather, as Aristotle
observed, and the social intuitionist model supports, "it is not
unimportant how we are habituated from our early days;
indeed it makes a huge difference-or rather all the
difference." 1 ' Even if the goal is maximizing personal choice,
the fundamental issue remains: should parents, communities,
and the larger society seek to habituate in their children
either through legal, social, or ethical norms self-interest or
something else?
B. Issues if Self-Interest Is the Desired Norm
1. Self-Interest, at Times, Can Undermine, Rather Than
Support, a Market Economy
Self-interested market participants-free of legal, social,
and ethical institutions-are not a prerequisite for a market
economy or for promoting overall happiness. Unbridled
capitalism, as Professors Akerlof and Shiller write, "does not
automatically produce what people really need; it produces
what they think they need, and are willing to pay for." 1 2 It
can maximize output of snake oil or products that eventually
wipe out the economy.183 Fielding congressional questioning
during the financial crisis, the former Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan expressed his "distress" in
discovering a "flaw" in his free-market beliefs: "Those of us
who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to
protect shareholder's equity (myself especially) are in a state
of shocked disbelief."1' 4
180. Id.
181. Id. at 24.
182. AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 78, at 26.
183. Id.; see also Anthony Faiola et al., What Went Wrong?, WASH. POST, Oct.
15, 2008, at A01 (noting several Clinton and Bush administrations officials'
opposition to regulation of derivatives).
184. Kara Scannell & Sudeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile
House Panel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2008, at Al, available at
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Granted people engage in commerce to promote their
satisfaction. It is not out of benevolence that I spend money
on auto repairs. But an economy, Amartya Sen recently
wrote, "needs other values and commitments such as mutual
trust and confidence to work efficiently."1 5  In athletic
contests, some cooperation and trust are required, and the
athletes generally abide by unwritten rules to ensure a fair
contest. 186 Likewise, markets rely on trust. Suppose a
prospective employer offers you a contract that meticulously
details its specific requirements, and identifies the penalty for
every conceivable transgression or deficient work
performance.1 7  Would you want to work there? The
behavioral experiments show how communicating these
penalties can backfire; by signaling distrust, the penalty
terms engender less productivity from the experiments'
employees. 18
8
Posner assumes that self-interested individuals will seek
out, while unusually fair people will avoid or be forced out of,
highly competitive businesses and academia. 8 9  His
empirically unsupported assumption is that those with this
http://online.wsj .com/article/SB122476545437862295.html.
185. Amartya Sen, Adam Smith's Market Never Stood Alone, FIN. TIMES,
March 11, 2009, at 11; see also Ashraf et al., supra note 108, at 136 (collecting
some of the literature on importance of trust in market economies).
186. For example, professional cyclists (generally from different teams) often
breakaway from the main body of riders (the peloton). See Bicycle Racing
Terminology: A Primer, http://www.amgentourofcalifornia.com/Peloton/
glossary.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2010). To prevent the peloton from catching
them, the breakaway cyclists must cooperate by taking turns riding up front.
Id. To take advantage of the slipstream, the cyclists often ride behind one
another. Id. Thus, the cyclist up front is working harder than others in the
paceline. Id. Moreover, the peloton riders enforce unwritten norms such as
discouraging tactical attacks during feed zones or bathroom breaks. Rob
Hodgetts, Cycling's Gentleman's Club, BBC SPORT, July 22, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/sport2/hi/other-sports/cycling/tour-de-france-
2003/3086279.stm.
187. Steven Goldberg, my thoughtful administrative law professor, often
began or ended classes with quotations. His quotation of Grant Gilmore comes
to mind:
Law reflects, but in no sense determines the moral worth of a
society .... The better the society, the less law there will be. In
Heaven, there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with the
lamb.... In Hell, there will be nothing but law, and due process will
be meticulously observed.
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAw 110-11 (1977).
188. Bowles, supra note 90, at 1608.
189. Posner, supra note 87, at 1570.
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maladaptive trait of fairness are somehow at a competitive
disadvantage. 190 But is this true?
Chicago School economist Albert Rees taught for several
decades the neoclassical economic theory of wage
determination, which had nothing to say of fairness.' 9' But
Rees confessed that this economic theory was of no help in his
administrative positions with the government, corporations,
and universities: "The factors involved in setting wages and
salaries in the real world seemed to be very different from
those specified in the neoclassical theory. The one factor that
seemed to be of overwhelming importance in all these
situations was fairness."192 Likewise the directors of Harvard
Negotiation Project in their national bestseller pressed
negotiators to identify and discuss the relevant fairness
standard(s). 193 Consumers, the behavioral experiments show,
are willing to sacrifice their economic interests to punish
unfair acts (e.g., through organized boycotts) and support
businesses they perceive as behaving fairly, and consumer
motivation increases as their personal costs decrease.'94
Contrary to Posner's assumption, firms must be sensitive
to fairness concerns,195 which are not necessarily the
outcomes predicted under neoclassical economic theory. For
example, a fair split in the Ultimatum Game is closer to 50:50
than 99:1. Consequently, even if maximizing profits is the
aim, market participants, like players in the Ultimatum
Game, must be attuned to the fair outcome; players highly
sensitive to the fair outcome in the Ultimatum Game are at a
competitive advantage to the Chicago School theorist who
assumes individuals solely pursue their self-interest. After a
natural disaster, many businesses could price gouge, but
decline to behave opportunistically for various reasons,
including the implications of short-run profit gains on long-
term profitability and non-economic reasons such as fairness
190. Id. at 1570-71.
191. AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 78, at 19.
192. Id. at 20.
193. ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN 151-57 (2d ed. 1991).
194. See Matthew Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory &
Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1282 (1993).
195. Fairness may be determined by a reference transaction set by legal,
social, or ethical norms. Jolls et al., supra note 78, at 1496.
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and customer loyalty.' 96
2. Reconciling Self-Interest's Conflict with Religious,
Ethical, and Social Norms
None of the major religions promote self-interest as a
virtue. 197 Instead they advocate other-regarding behavior
and treating others as one would like to be treated. The chief
rabbi of Britain, for example, argued that capitalism without
an ethical core cannot sustain itself:
When everything that matters can be bought and sold,
when commitments can be broken because they are no
longer to our advantage, when shopping becomes salvation
and advertising slogans become our litany, when our
worth is measured by how much we earn and spend, then
the market is destroying the very virtues on which in the
long run it depends.1 98
Aside from religious norms, children through schooling,
volunteer activities, and other forms of socialization are
taught altruism, compassion' 99 and empathy. If the goal is to
promote self-interest, it makes no sense for children to
internalize norms of altruism, compassion and empathy, only
to reject these norms in adulthood. Before advocating self-
interest, one must inquire why societies promote these other
norms. Empathy, even for adults, can debias moral
judgments. Social intuitionism finds that people at times
lack the capacity to reach moral judgments through pure
reason. Thus a principal pathway to moral judgments is
empathy. 00 Studies find that psychopaths understand the
196. Id. at 1512-15 (noting literature on why fairness considerations explain
firms that do not raise prices opportunistically and why state residents support
criminal and civil penalties of price gouging, which some economists view as
ethically neutral); Kahneman et al., supra note 94, at 735 (discussing surveyed
individuals' adverse reaction to grocery store raising prices when its competitor
is temporarily forced to close); Stucke, Behavioral Economists, supra note 11, at
561-62 (discussing how actual firm behavior may deviate from that of self-
interested firms).
197. Stigler, supra note 175 ("[A] dislike for profit-seeking is one of the few
specific attitudes shared by the major religions.").
198. HOWARD GARDNER, FIvE MINDS FOR THE FUTURE 137 (2007) (quoting
JONATHAN SACKS, To HEAL A FRACTURED WORLD (2005)).
199. Envy commonly opposes compassion, which is "love, insofar as it so
affects a man that he is glad at another's good fortune, and saddened by his ill
fortune." BENEDICT DE SPINOzA, ETHICS 107-08 (Penguin Books 1996) (1677).
200. Haidt, supra note 177, at 819.
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rules of social behavior and their action's harmful
consequences, but they simply do not care.2 ' By putting
oneself in the other person's position, one may experience
multiple competing intuitions,2 2 which helps mitigate self-
serving bias,20 3 and has been identified as the "single most
effective skill in negotiation."20
4
3. How Does Self-Interest Improve Individual Welfare?
Although happiness is complex, economists increasingly
since the 1990s have analyzed the determinants of happiness
in different countries.20 5  The economic literature shows
happiness as weakly related to income.20 6 In the United
States, higher-income individuals (those in the highest decile)
reported on average the highest level of happiness. 207 But the
happiness economic literature does not identify a correlation
between self-interest and greater happiness. After one's basic
needs are met, there is no strong correlation between
increases in wealth and subjective happiness. For example,
the mean income (adjusted for inflation) of the top decile in
the United States increased thirty-three percent between
1972 and 1996, but the mean happiness rating for
that wealthy group remained the same. 20  This is not
especially controversial. Economists generally recognize the
diminishing marginal utility of money.209
Studies also show that once a country's gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita exceeds a moderate income level
201. Id. at 824.
202. Id. at 819.
203. Jolls et al., supra note 78, at 1503-04.
204. WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No: NEGOTIATING YOUR WAY FROM
CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION 19 (1993).
205. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, What Can Economists Learn from
Happiness Research?, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 402, 404 (2002).
206. In multivariate regressions, income as it correlates to subjective
happiness evaluations has a low coefficient. Id. at 410; see also Elizabeth Dunn
et al., Spending Money on Others Promotes Happiness, SCIENCE, Mar. 21, 2008,
at 1687.
207. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 205, at 410 (showing that on a three-point
scale ranging from not to happy (1), pretty happy (2), and very happy (3), the
tenth decile between 1994-1996 had a mean happiness rating of 2.36, which
was slightly higher than the ninth decile's mean of 2.3).
208. Id.
209. Matthew Rabin, Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot
Explain Risk Aversion, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 202, 202 (Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
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($12,000), societies do not become happier as they get richer:
"large increases in income for a given country over time are
not associated with increases in average subjective well-
being."210  For example, per capita income (adjusted for
inflation) in the United States more than doubled between
1945 and 1991, but Americans are not necessarily happier.211
The percentage of "very happy" Americans has not increased;
nor has the percentage of "not very happy" Americans
substantially decreased.
12
Although poverty is increasing in the United States, most
Americans, noted the OECD, enjoy a living standard whereby
they can spend a significant share of their income on goods
and services other than food, shelter, clothing, or other
basics.213 Since the Sherman Act was enacted, average family
income (adjusted for inflation) increased threefold.214 The
percentage of total expenditures on discretionary items more
than doubled since 1901 (with most of the increases occurring
between 1901 and 1984).215 In 1901, the average U.S. family
devoted 79.8 percent of its spending to food, clothing, and
housing.216 By 2002-2003, U.S. families reduced spending on
210. Daniel Kahneman et al., Would You Be Happier If You Were Richer? A
Focusing Illusion, SCIENCE, June 30, 2006, at 1908; see also DANIEL NETTLE,
HAPPINESS: THE SCIENCE BEHIND YOUR SMILE 15, 72-73 (2005); Rafael Di Tella
& Robert MacCulloch, Some Uses of Happiness Data in Economics, 20 J. ECON.
PERSP. 25, 26 (2006); Daniel Kahneman & Alan B. Krueger, Developments in
the Measurement of Subjective Well-Being, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 15-16 (2006)
(stating that despite China's real income per capita increasing by a factor of 2.5
between 1994-2005, there has been no increase in reported life satisfaction, and
an increase in percentage who are dissatisfied); Frey & Stutzer, supra note 205,
at 413 (stating that Japan's income per capita increased six-fold between 1958
and 1991, while average life satisfaction remained unchanged).
211. RICHARD LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE 29-30
(2005); Di Tella & MacCulloch, supra note 210, at 26; Frey & Stutzer, supra
note 205, at 403.
212. LAYARD, supra note 211, at 29-30.
213. TRACEY STRANGE & ANNE BAYLEY, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
LINKING ECONOMY, SOCIETY, ENVIRONMENT 79 (2008).
214. In 1901 the average U.S. family's income was $750. In 2002-2003, this
family's real income, expressed in 1901 dollars, would have increased threefold,
to $2282. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 100 YEARS
OF U.S. CONSUMER SPENDING DATA FOR THE NATION, NEW YORK CITY, AND
BOSTON 65 (2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/uscs/reflections.pdf.
215. In 2002-2003, the average U.S. family could allocate 49.9 percent
($20,333) of total expenditures for various discretionary consumer goods and
services, while the average family in 1901 could allocate only 20.2 percent, or
$155, for discretionary spending. Id.
216. Id. at 66.
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necessities to 50.1 percent.217
With increases in discretionary income, Americans can
now consume more goods and services. Unlike the Kramdens
in the 1950s television show, The Honeymooners, Americans
today no longer consider automobiles,218 television sets,219
washer and dryers, 220 and telephones as luxuries. 221 A recent
government report concluded from these findings:
Perhaps as revealing as the shift in consumer expenditure
shares over the past 100 years is the wide variety of
consumer items that had not been invented during the
early decades of the 20th century but are commonplace
today. In the 21st century, households throughout the
country have purchased computers, televisions, iPods,
DVD players, vacation homes, boats, planes, and
217. Id. In 1901, U.S. households allotted 42.5 percent of their expenditures
for food; by 2002-03, food's share of spending dropped to 13.2 percent. Id. By
the twenty-first century, however, the average U.S. family allocated just 58.1
percent of food spending for food eaten at home and 41.9 percent for food eaten
away from home. Id.
218. Between 1934 and 1936, 44.4 percent of U.S. households owned an
automobile. Id. at 69. In New York City and Boston, where well-developed
public transportation was available, the percentages were 14.8 and 14.1,
respectively. Id. By the twenty-first century, eighty-eight percent of U.S.
households had at least one vehicle, with the average U.S. family owning two.
Id. In New York City, the average household owned 1.4 vehicles; in Boston, 1.6.
Id.
219. The percentage of U.S. homes with a television set went from nine
percent in 1950 to 87.1 percent in 1960, to ninety-eight percent in 1978.
Number of TV Households in America, http://www.tvhistory.tv/AnnualTV_
Households_50-78.JPG (last visited Jan. 10, 2010).
220. The percentage of housing units with clothes washers ranged from fifty-
seven percent for the lowest income level (less than $15,000); seventy-two
percent ($15,000-$29,999); eighty-two percent ($30,000-$49,999); eighty-nine
percent ($50,000-$74,999); and ninety-four percent for the highest income level
($75,000 or more). U.S. Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Dep't Energy, The Effect of
Income on Appliances in U.S. Households, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/recs/
appliances/appliances.html. The percentage of households owning clothing
dryers is forty-five percent for the lowest income level and ninety-two percent
for the highest income level. Id. Ownership of both a washer and dryer is
related to the type of housing unit the respondent lives in. Id. Ninety-one
percent of residents in single-family, detached homes have a washer and a
dryer; only nineteen percent of residents in large apartment buildings (five or
more rental units) have both. Id.
221. Some appliances are common in the home regardless of income level,
such as refrigerators (99.9 percent of households), cooking appliances (which
includes the standard oven with stove-top burners, separate stove and ovens,
and toaster ovens) (99.7 percent), and color televisions (98.9 percent).
Residential Energy Consumption Survey 2001: Housing Characteristics Data
Tables, httpJ/www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/recsfrecs200l/detailtables.html.
MONEY, IS THAT WHAT I WANT?
recreational vehicles. They have sent their children to
summer camps; contributed to retirement and pension
funds; attended theatrical and musical performances and
sporting events; joined health, country, and yacht clubs;
and taken domestic and foreign vacation excursions.
These items, which were unknown and undreamt of a
century ago, are tangible proof that U.S. households today
enjoy a higher standard of living. 222
Whether or not iPods and other material goods are
"tangible proof' of a higher, better living standard, the basic
needs for many Americans are met. Thus, the happiness
literature predicts that further increases in wealth and
consumption will not correlate with greater happiness.
C. Why Do Many People Whose Basic Needs Are Met Yearn to
Consume More Goods and Services?
One could reply that people inherently know what makes
them happy. For centuries, people across cultures revealed
through their choices (such as purchasing lottery tickets)
their desire for wealth. So economists can assess people's
preferences, not by their subjective beliefs or intentions, but
by their actual choices. Because looking at people's actual
choices is a more objective method to infer individuals' utility,
and because people's choices reveal their preference for
wealth, self-interest is a proper norm.
As Part II showed, people in the Ultimatum Game and
other behavioral experiments do not always choose to
maximize wealth. But behavioral economics also casts doubt
on this assumption of revealed preferences.223 Although this
article focuses on bounded self-interest, the behavioral
experiments identify many heuristics and biases that
systematically appear in human decision-making.224 We at
222. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 214, at 70.
223. Frey & Stutzer, supra note 205, at 404-05; Kahneman & Krueger, supra
note 210, at 3-4; George Loewenstein & Peter A. Ubel, Hedonic Adaptation and
the Role of Decision and Experience Utility in Public Policy, 92 J. PUB. ECON.
1795 (2008).
224. In contrast to Bernoulli's theory of expected utility, prospect theory
predicts that individuals favor risk aversion for gains, favor risk seeking for
losses, and most importantly suffer loss aversion, whereby the dissatisfaction in
actually losing money from a reference point (say $100) is greater than the
satisfaction in winning that sum of money. Kahneman, supra note 155, at
1456-57. For example, rational individuals with stable preferences, unlike
actual consumers, would not distinguish between merchants: (a) requiring
2010] 931
932 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:50
times predict poorly as to what will make us happy; so we
choose poorly. As Professors Kahneman and Krueger
observe, "If people display bounded rationality when it comes
to maximizing utility, then their choices do not necessarily
reflect their 'true' preferences, and an exclusive reliance on
choices to infer what people desire loses some of its appeal."225
Rather than inferring utility from observed choices, some
economists now seek to capture happiness directly by
measuring individuals' subjective well-being.226  But this
measure of utility is also susceptible to human biases. Many
people are aware that accumulations of wealth (or the goods
and services purchased) in the long run do not yield greater
happiness. One lore is that money does not buy happiness.
So why do many people find jumping off the hedonic treadmill
difficult? 227
The happiness studies show how people inaccurately
predict: (1) the impact of future life events on their happiness
(such as junior professors' prediction if denied tenure);228 (2)
their adaptation to their new condition (whether a physical
disability or winning the lottery);229 and (3) the strong effects
of relative rather than absolute wealth on satisfaction.23 °
customers to pay a five percent surcharge for using a credit card or (b)
giving customers a five percent discount for paying cash. ITM RESEARCH,
THE ABOLITION OF THE NO-DISCRIMINATION RULE 7-8 (2000),
http://www.creditslips.org/files/netherlands-no-discrimination-rule-study.pdf.
225. Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 210, at 3.
226. Id. at 18-21 (proposing U-index measure of the proportion time an
individual spends in an unpleasant state).
227. LAYARD, supra note 211, at 48.
228. Kahneman et al., supra note 210, at 1908; Daniel Kahneman and Robert
Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy Evaluation, 32 ENVTL. &
RESOURCE ECON. 161, 170 (2005).
229. Di Tella & MacCulloch, supra note 210, at 36 n.7.
230. LAYARD, supra note 211, at 41-43; NETTLE, supra note 210, at 73.
Similarly, people rarely choose things in absolute terms, but instead based on
their relative advantage to other things. ARIELY, supra note 78, at 2. As
Professor Ariely discusses, by adding a third more expensive choice, for
example, the marketer can steer consumers to a more expensive second choice.
Id. In one behavioral economics study, 100 MIT students were offered three
choices for the Economist magazine: (i) Internet-only subscription for fifty-nine
dollars (sixteen students); (ii) print-only subscriptions for $125 (no students);
and (iii) print-and-Internet subscriptions for $125 (eighty-four students). Id. at
5. When the "decoy" second choice (print-only subscriptions) was removed and
only the first and third options were presented, the students did not react
similarly. Id. at 5-6. Instead sixty-eight students opted for Internet-only
subscription for fifty-nine dollars (up from sixteen students) and only thirty-two
students chose print-and-Internet subscriptions for $125 (down from eighty-four
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People often predict greater happiness they would achieve if
they were only wealthier. But "increases in income have
mostly a transitory effect on individuals' reported life
satisfaction."231  Winners of large amounts of money in
lotteries, for example, have a temporary boost in happiness.232
Individuals may desire more goods and services, but after
obtaining them, they become preoccupied with obtaining
other goods and services.233
Many people do not care solely about absolute levels of
wealth or personal consumption, but also about changes in
their wealth and consumption relative to others.234 One's
total income is less important than relative income, namely
earning slightly more than one's peers, neighbors, friends, or,
as H.L. Mencken observed, one's wife's sister's husband.235
We compete by comparing ourselves to the wealth and
consumption of our peers and the socio-economic class
immediately above us; after adapting to the higher rung, we
strive for more.236
Behavioral economists describe this "focusing illusion" in
pursuing happiness as the fact that "[n]othing that you focus
on will make as much difference as you think."237 One
example of this bias came from a recent experiment, which
reaffirmed "[there is more happiness in giving than in
receiving. First the study's authors found from a
nationally representative survey that personal spending was
students). Id. at 5-6.
231. Kahneman et al., supra note 210, at 1909.
232. NETTLE, supra note 210, at 75. Even people with acquired disabilities or
health problems show considerable, but not always complete, adaptation to
happiness. Id. at 83.
233. Id. at 76-77; Kahneman et al., supra note 210, at 1909-10.
234. Rabin, supra note 88, at 661.
235. Kahneman et al., supra note 210, at 1909; see also David Neumark &
Andrew Postlewaite, Relative Income Concerns and the Rise in Married
Women's Employment, 70 J. PUB. ECON. 157 (1998) (finding that women's
employment decisions are positively related to sisters' employment decisions; all
else being equal, women whose sisters live nearby and worked the past year are
about ten to fifteen percent more likely to work than women whose sisters did
not work).
236. ARIELY, supra note 78, at 17-18.
237. David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make
People Happy?, PSYCHOL. SC., Sept. 1998, at 345; see also Daniel Kahneman &
Richard H. Thaler, Utility Maximization & Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON.
PERSP. 221 (2006).
238. 20 Acts of the Apostles 35 (New Jerusalem Bible).
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unrelated to happiness, but spending more of one's income on
others predicted greater happiness. 239  Higher prosocial
spending (e.g., gifts for others and donations to charity) was
associated with significantly greater happiness. 24°  The
study's authors next performed a before-and-after field study
of employees who received a profit-sharing bonus. They
found that "employees who devoted more of their bonus to
prosocial spending experienced greater happiness after
receiving the bonus, and the manner in which they spent that
bonus was a more important predictor of their happiness than
the size of the bonus itself."24 1  In a third experiment,
participants, after rating their happiness in the morning,
were given an envelope containing money (either five dollars
or twenty dollars) and were told to spend the money by five
p.m. that day. 242 In one group participants were told to
spend the money on themselves; the second group was told to
spend the money on someone else or give it to a charity. After
five p.m. the participants were asked about their happiness.
Although the amount of money the participants received (five
dollars or twenty dollars) did not have a significant effect on
their happiness, participants who gave the money away
reported greater post-windfall happiness than did
participants who spent it on themselves.243
So if giving leads to greater happiness, the study's
authors ask, why don't we spend a little less on ourselves and
donate a little more?2 44 People predict poorly. The authors
found that sixty-three percent of the university students
predicted personal spending would make them happier than
prosocial spending, and that twenty dollars would make them
happier than five dollars.245
239. Dunn et al., supra note 206, at 1687.
240. Id.




245. Dunn et al., supra note 206, at 1688. In another recent experiment,
neuroscientists and economists combined brain imaging techniques and
behavioral economics research to better understand individuals' tendency to
overbid. Specifically, they examined whether the fear of losing the social
competition inherent in an auction game, in part, causes people to pay too
much. Mauricio R. Delgado et al., Understanding Overbidding Using the
Neural Circuitry of Reward to Design Economic Auctions, SCIENCE, Sept. 26,
2008, at 1849. At the beginning of each auction round, the loss-frame group
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Although the happiness economic literature empirically
tested this focusing illusion, the ancient Greeks and Romans,
early Christian theologians,246 and economists such as Adam
Smith2 47 and Thorstein Veblen2 41 warned readers about it.
Lucius Annaeus Seneca noted that some gadgets are
purchased not because of their inherent utility, but "because
others have bought them or they're in most people's
houses."249 These desires can never be satiated, he said, as
we shall adapt to our current lifestyle, and envy those on the
higher rung: "However much you possess there's someone else
who has more, and you'll be fancying yourself to be short of
things you need to the exact extent to which you lag behind
him."25° Plutarch similarly observed, prisoners "envy those
who have been freed, who envy those with citizen status, who
in turn envy rich people, who envy province commanders,
who envy kings, who-because they almost aspire to making
thunder and lightning--envy the gods."251 If the poor aspire
to be wealthy, and the wealthy aspire to be king, it logically
follows that the tyrant who possesses unparalleled power and
fortune is the happiest. But as the tyrant Dionysius
members were given fifteen dollars; they were told that if they won the auction
for that round, they would get the payoff from the auction and could keep the
fifteen dollars. If they lost, they would have to return the fifteen dollars. Id.
The bonus-frame group members were told that if they won that auction round
they would get a fifteen-dollar bonus at the end of the round. Id. This framing
should not affect a rational self-interested player: the winner of each round gets
an extra fifteen dollars, the loser gets nothing. Id. Nonetheless the loss-
treatment group members outbid the bonus-treatment group members, which
outbid the baseline group. Id. This might prove an interesting experiment for
anyone running their school fundraising charity. Project on the wall each
family's name in a picture of a donated "brick." Every time the family loses an
auction, its name becomes fainter. Those that win any auction item get to have
their donated brick used in the school.
246. SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 33 (1961) (acknowledging "man's
insatiable desire for the poverty he calls wealth"); SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS,
COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE, reprinted in ACQUINAS'S SHORTER SUMMA 353-56
(2002).
247. See infra notes 230-33.
248. See infra notes 234-37.
249. SENECA, Letter CXXIII, in LETTERS FROM A STOIC 227 (Robin Campbell
trans, 1969).
250. SENECA, Letter CIV, in LETTERS FROM A STOIC, supra note 249, at 186.
251. PLUTARCH, On Contentment, in ESSAYS 222 (Ian Kidded., Robin H.
Waterfield trans., 1992). Bruce Springsteen's song Badlands repeats this
theme: "Poor man wanna be rich, rich man wanna be king, and a king ain't
satisfied till he rules everything." BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Badlands, on
DARKNESS ON THE EDGE OF TowN (Columbia 1978).
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demonstrated in his experiment on one flatterer Damocles,
tyrants cannot be happy.252 "There is a sickness that infects
all tyrants, they cannot trust their friends."2 53 Similarly, a
key factor in predicting happiness in a country is the
proportion of its citizens who say that others can be
trusted.254
Adam Smith in 1759 likewise warned about this focusing
illusion and status competition.255 People labor night and day
to acquire talents superior to their competitors, and solicit
every employment opportunity, only to serve those whom
they hate, and be obsequious to those whom they despise.2 6
On the deathbed, they may realize the emptiness of the quest:
It is then, in the last dregs of life, his body wasted with
toil and diseases, his mind galled and ruffled by the
memory of a thousand injuries and disappointments which
he imagines he has met with from the injustice of his
enemies, or from the perfidy and ingratitude of his friends,
that he begins at last to find that wealth and greatness
are mere trinkets of frivolous utility, no more adapted for
procuring ease of body or tranquillity of mind than the
tweezer-cases of the lover of toys; and like them too, more
troublesome to the person who carries them about with
him than all the advantages they can afford him are
commodious. 257
252. CICERO, ON THE GOOD LIFE 84-85 (Michael Grant trans., 1971).
253. Aeschylus, The Prometheus Bound, in THREE GREEK PLAYS 105 (Edith
Hamilton trans., 1965). How can they when they believe their friends are
capable of the same vices? For if the minds of tyrants could be laid bare, "there
would be seen gashes and wounds; for, as the body is lacerated by scourging, so
is the spirit by brutality, by lust, and by evil thoughts." CORNELIUS TACITUS,
The Annals VI.6-9, in THE ANNALS & THE HISTORIES, supra note 85, at 170.
254. LAYARD, supra note 211, at 64, 68-69.
255. ADAM SMITH, supra note 86, at IV.I 183-87, states:
How many people ruin themselves by laying out money on trinkets of
frivolous utility? What pleases these lovers of toys is not so much the
utility, as the aptness of the machines which are fitted to promote it.
All their pockets are stuffed with little conveniencies. They contrive
new pockets, unknown in the clothes of other people, in order to carry a
greater number....
Nor is it only with regard to such frivolous objects that our conduct
is influenced by this principle; it is often the secret motive of the most
serious and important pursuits of both private and public life.
Id. at 183.
256. Id. at 184.
257. Id. Thus the trinkets' real purpose is to "more effectually gratify that
love of distinction so natural to man." Id.
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Self-deception, for Adam Smith, drives market
productivity. 2 58
Thorstein Veblen in 1899 (nine years after the Sherman
Antitrust Act was enacted) observed that the predominant
motive for conspicuous consumption is the "invidious
distinction attaching to wealth."259  The accumulation of
goods and services forms the conventional basis of esteem.
He too noted how the hedonic treadmill never stops: "[T]he
present pecuniary standard [marks] the point of departure for
a fresh increase in wealth; and this in turn gives rise to a new
standard of sufficiency and a new pecuniary classification of
one's self as compared with one's neighbors."26 ° Chronically
dissatisfied with his present lot, man will strain to place "a
wider and ever-widening pecuniary interval between himself
and the average standard."26' For Veblen, like the social
scientists before him, our ideal of consumption lies just
beyond our immediate reach.262
Status competition and the hedonic treadmill have
confounded consumers for centuries. John Maynard Keynes,
for example, assumed that as a result of increased
productivity and living standards, people in developed
economies could work only fifteen hours per week.263 He
identified two classes of needs-"those needs which are
absolute in the sense that we feel them whatever the
situation of our fellow human beings may be, and those which
are relative in the sense that we feel them only if their
satisfaction lifts us above, makes us feel superior to, our
fellows."2 4  So as its economy developed, society should
deemphasize the importance of relative needs:
When the accumulation of wealth is no longer of high
social importance, there will be great changes in the code
of morals. We shall be able to rid ourselves of many of the
pseudo-moral principles which have hag-ridden us for two
258. Id. at IV.I.10 182.
259. THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS 26 (Penguin
Books 1994) (1899).
260. Id. at 31.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 103-04.
263. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren,
in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 358, 369 (1932) ("For three hours a day is quite
enough to satisfy the old Adam in most of us!").
264. Id. at 365.
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hundred years, by which we have exalted some of the most
distasteful of human qualities into the position of the
highest virtues. We shall be able to afford to dare to
assess the money-motive at its true value. The love of
money as a possession-as distinguished from the love of
money as a means to the enjoyments and realities of life-
will be recognised for what it is, a somewhat disgusting
morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological
propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the
specialists in mental disease. All kinds of social customs
and economic practices, affecting the distribution of
wealth and of economic rewards and penalties, which we
now maintain at all costs, however distasteful and unjust
they may be in themselves, because they are tremendously
useful in promoting the accumulation of capital, we shall
then be free, at last, to discard.265
So why aren't many Americans, Europeans, and Asians
today working fifteen or even twenty hours per week? While
predicting the rise in productivity and real living standards,
Keynes "underestimated the appeal of materialism."2 66
D. If Self-Interest Does Not Yield Greater Happiness, What
Does?
One defense of self-interest is that happiness is elusive.
Some people intentionally confound happiness. Even if social
scientists modeled the formula for happiness, "what joy will
[an individual] get out of functioning according to a
timetable?"2 67  Others accept Aristotle's belief that the path
toward happiness is practicing virtue, yet disagree that
perfect happiness is attainable on earth.2 68  Thus, if
theologians and philosophers disagree over whether and how
happiness can be attained, then happiness is an unrealistic
measure for evaluating self-interest as a proper norm.
Measuring happiness can indeed be fickle. 269  But
265. Id. at 369-70.
266. Jonathan Guthrie, Anything to Distract Us from the Arts of Life, FIN.
TIMEs, Apr. 30, 2009, at 11 (quoting Professor Alan Manning).
267. DOSTOYEVSKY, supra note 176, at 104.
268. See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 246, at 197-98.
269. Individual responses can depend on the order or wording of questions,
the scales applied, a fortunate event (like the individual discovering a dime
before the questioning), or the current weather. Frey & Stutzer, supra note
205, at 406; Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 210, at 6-7. One study, for
example, examined the correlation between the responses of two questions:
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drawing from large diverse samples, the happiness economic
literature yields consistent conclusions. In examining
happiness in fifty countries in up to four years, one study
identified six factors that can explain eighty percent of the
variation in happiness: divorce rate, unemployment rate,
level of trust, membership in non-religious organizations,
quality of government, and fraction believing in God.27 ° On
an individual level, the primary sources of happiness are
family relationships, employment, community and friends,
health, self-control or autonomy, personal ethical and moral
values, and the quality of the environment.271 One's financial
situation is also a factor, but has a weak correlation with
happiness. 272  Personal control-the ability to control one's
life or achieve a spiritual indifference 273 -according to a
British life satisfaction study, is a better predictor of
happiness than income.274
Individuals, who look beyond their self-interest and
practice religion, "belong to community organizations, do
voluntary work, and have rich social connections [generally]
are healthier and happier than those who do not."27 5
Sophocles observed that the noblest work occurs when a
"How happy are you?" and "How many dates did you have last month?" Norbert
Schwartz & Fritz Strack, Reports of Subjective Well-Being: Judgmental
Processes and Their Methodological Implications, in WELL-BEING: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 63 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds.,
1999). When the happiness question was asked first, no correlation was found
between the responses. Id. But when the dating question was asked first, there
was a significant correlation between the two questions' responses. Id.
Likewise, in another study, individuals were first asked to report either three
positive or negative recent life events. Respondents who were first asked to
recall the recent positive events reported higher current life satisfaction than
those who were first ask to report three recent negative events. Id. at 65.
270. LAYARD, supra note 211, at 71.
271. Id. at 62-73; NETTLE, supra note 210, at 85, 87.
272. LAYARD, supra note 211, at 64.
273. St. Ignatius of Loyola described this spiritual indifference:
[Wie must above all endeavour to establish in ourselves a complete
indifference towards all created things, though the use of them may not
be otherwise forbidden; not giving, as far as depends on us, any
preference to health over sickness, riches over poverty, honour over
humiliation, a long life over a short. But we must desire and choose
definitively in every thing what will lead us to the end of our creation.
SAINT IGNATIUS, THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISEs OF ST. IGNATIUS 22 (Kessinger
Publishing 2005).
274. NETTLE, supra note 210, at 74.
275. Id. at 156-57.
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person helps others with all her gifts and native strength.276
Likewise, the most satisfying jobs were, as one recent survey
found, "especially those involving caring for, teaching, and
protecting others and creative pursuits,"277 not those jobs
with the highest salaries or that reward self-interest.
Heading the list were members of the clergy (87.3 percent
very satisfied), followed by physical therapists (with the
second highest mean score and 78.1 percent very satisfied),
and firefighters (80.1 percent very satisfied).278 Occupations
with the happiest reported people were the clergy (67.2
percent very happy) and firefighters (57.2 percent very
happy). 279
Closer to home, many lawyers have left financially
lucrative positions. There is a high attrition rate at law firms
and non-private firm attorneys tend to be much happier. 28 0 A
2008 survey asked, "If you could change one aspect of your job
as a lawyer, which one of the following would it be?"281 The
surveyed lawyers' top two choices were (i) decreased job stress
(thirty-one percent) and (ii) fewer hours at work or more
personal time (thirty percent). Only two percent identified
higher salaries/compensation.
IV. RISKS IF SOCIAL POLICIES PROMOTE SELF-INTEREST
As Parts II and III addressed, the neoclassical economic
theories' assumption of self-interest is neither descriptive nor
normative. Self-interested behavior does not necessarily
improve, and may undermine, a market economy, is
inconsistent with moral and social norms of empathy and
compassion, and does not correlate with greater overall or
individual happiness. The evidence instead shows that
rationality includes the use of reason to help others and
improve our community (and thereby ourselves).
276. SOPHOCLES, Oedipus the King, in THE THREE THEBAN PLAYS 176
(Robert Fagles trans., 1984).
277. TOM W. SMITH, NORCIUNIV. OF CHI., JOB SATISFACTION IN THE UNITED




280. Peter H. Huang & Rick Swedloff, Authentic Happiness and Meaning at
Law Firms, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 335 (2008).
281. Press Release, Robert Half Legal, Lawyers Seek Less Stress on the Job
(Oct. 7, 2008), httpi/legalrhimediaroom.com/lessstressonthejob.
[Vol:50
MONEY, IS THAT WHAT I WANT?
A Chicago School theorist might agree that people do not
(nor should they) invariably pursue their self-interest.
Instead, this assumption is useful in the context of
commercial transactions. Consumers often choose retailers or
manufacturers with better or similar goods and services at
lower prices. No one quibbles when consumers seek to save
some money by going to the cheaper gas station. Likewise
the assumption of self-interest must be viewed in connection
with the Chicago School's economic goal for antitrust, namely
maximizing total welfare (or for others consumer welfare).282
Antitrust's central task, for the Chicago School, "is to identify
and prohibit those forms of behavior whose net effect is
output restricting and hence detrimental. 2 3  Private
coordinated restraints on the output of goods and services are
suspect.284  Antitrust seeks to prevent competitors from
agreeing to increase prices above and reduce output below
competitive levels.2 8  Absent collusion, prices are lower,
output is greater, and price-sensitive consumers can save or
consume more.
Within these happy confines, promoting self-interest and
deterring collusive reductions in output are uncontroverted.
No one contends that consumers should opt for higher-priced
inferior goods and services or that a market economy benefits
from cartels that reduce output.
But policymakers can become restless within these
confines and press further. If society benefits whenever
consumers pursue their self-interest in opting for lower-
priced, better quality goods, shouldn't society likewise benefit
282. See Stucke, supra note 48, at 991-1008 (discussing the dispute over the
terms' meaning and how the concepts are actually measured).
283. BORK, supra note 44, at 122; see also Chi. Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v.
Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The core question in
antitrust is output. Unless a contract reduces output in some market, to the
detriment of consumers, there is no antitrust problem.") (Easterbrook, J.).
284. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 107-08 (1984) [hereinafter NCAA] ('Restrictions on price and output
are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was
intended to prohibit."); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) [hereinafter BMI] (stating that Court's per se illegal rule
applies when "the practice facially appears to be one that would always or
almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output"); see also U.S.
Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing
antitrust laws designed to encourage productive efficiencies, higher output, and
lower prices) (Easterbrook, J.).
285. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107.
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whenever people seek to maximize their wealth? "Greed is
the foundation of much economic activity."" 6 Likewise, if
society is harmed whenever competitors agree to reduce
output, does it not follow that society necessarily benefits
whenever competitors increase output?28
7
In markets with a downward sloping demand curve, and
absent price discrimination, increases in output generally are
associated with lower prices. To put it differently, as price
decreases, consumer demand for the product increases. As
the firm's output increases, productive efficiencies accrue. As
its cost in making the product decreases, the firm can further
lower price and increase output. Once-considered luxury
goods (such as DVD players, cell phones) are affordable to
more consumers, who generally benefit from a greater choice
of lower-priced goods and services. Labor may be needed to
further increase output, thereby reducing unemployment.2 8
All benefit thereby. "Production and consumption together
form the backbone of the economy," observed the OECD.28 9
Even without governmental prodding, profit-maximizing
firms will continue to promote consumption of their products.
But to what extent should the government, either through
soft paternalism or hard policies, promote self-interest and
increased consumption and output for their own sake? A
helpful exercise is to consider the risks from these
governmental policies.
This exercise is not an academic adventure. While
policymakers are reevaluating their economic theories during
this financial crisis, U.S. consumers are reevaluating their
economic behavior. When on the treadmill, many U.S.
consumers were predisposed to consuming. But in this
financial crisis, they are curtailing spending and increasing
personal savings. 29 ° In one 2008 survey, eighty-four percent
286. Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323, 1326 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook,
J.).
287. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103 ("Broadcast Music squarely holds that a joint
selling arrangement may be so efficient that it will increase sellers' aggregate
output and thus be procompetitive." (citing BMI, 441 U.S. at 18-23)).
288. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 102 (1998).
289. STRANGE & BAYLEY, supra note 213, at 81 (discussing in context of
sustainable development).
290. Jonathan Birchall & Jenny Wiggins, Retail Suppliers Chase the Value in
a Shift to Thrift, FIN. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at 15; Jack Healy, As the Recession
Worsens, Consumers Save More and Spend Less, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at
B3.
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were inclined "to buy less stuff' and ninety percent were
considering opting for a simpler life.291 Fewer Americans in
2009 (compared to those surveyed in 2006) viewed various
household items as necessities.292 Perhaps the financial crisis
has suspended the era of super-sized stores, homes, cars,
meals, parents, and children.293
But during a recession teetering on a depression,
government authorities are tempted to exhort consumers to
get back on the hedonic treadmill and make up for lost
output. 294 This temptation is especially significant after U.S.
industrial output in September 2008 experienced its biggest
decline in thirty-four years. 29  Although some incremental
spending by the public and private sectors is needed to get
the U.S. economy through this recession, this part identifies
several risks if the government either through soft
291. BrainReserve Survey Details America's "Culture of Recession,"
MARKETWIRE, Sept. 10, 2008, http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Faith-
Popcorn%27S-Brainreserve-898522.html.
292. Rich Morin & Paul Taylor, Luxury or Necessity? The Public Makes a U-
Turn, PEW RES. CTR., Apr. 23, 2009, http://pewsocialtrends.org/pubs/733/luxury-
necessity-recession-era-reevaluations (discussing how people view some
household electronic items-microwave (only forty-seven percent viewed it a
necessity, down from sixty-eight percent in 2006), television set (fifty-two
percent, down twelve percentage points from 2006 and the smallest share since
the question was first asked over thirty-five years ago), car (minus three percent
to eighty-eight percent), clothes dryer (minus seventeen percent to sixty-six
percent); home computer (minus one percent to fifty percent), cable or satellite
television (minus ten percent to twenty-three percent), and dishwasher (minus
fourteen percent to twenty-one percent)).
293. Elizabeth Kolbert, Why Are We So Fat?, NEW YORKER, July 20, 2009, at
73-76, available at http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/books/2009/07/20/
090720crbobookskolbert; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
Overweight and Obesity, http'/www.cdc.gov/obesity/childhood/prevalence.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2010) (revealing survey data from 1976-1980 and 2003-
2006 that shows the prevalence of obesity has increased for children aged two-
to-five years from five percent to 12.4 percent; for those aged six-to-eleven years,
from 6.5 percent to seventeen percent; and for those aged twelve-to-nineteen
years, prevalence increased from five percent to 17.6 percent).
294. Stimulus Spending Before the Comm. on House Oversight and Gov't
Reform, 111th Cong. (July 8, 2009) (statement of Robert L. Nabors II, Deputy
Director Office of Management and Budget) (noting the roughly seven-percent
'significant" gap between what the U.S. economy is capable of producing and
what it is actually producing so "[ilmmediately after taking office, the President
and the Congress focused on restoring the demand for goods and services that
our economy could produce with its existing capacity as the key to returning the
nation to a path of economic growth").
295. Daniel Pimlott & James Politi, Output Falls at Fastest Rate in 34 Years,
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2008, at 5.
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paternalism or hard policies promotes self-interest and
continual increases in output.
A. Promoting Self-Interest Quickens the Hedonic Treadmill
As the OECD observed, "[wle live in a 'productivist'
society, where growth and economic activity have long been
the central focus of the activities we undertake as individuals
and communities."2 9 It becomes apparent how social policies
that encourage increased output, conspicuous consumption,
and self-interest are reinforcing.
Let us begin with the least sinister social policy, namely
maximizing output of consumer goods and services, to see
how it can reinforce conspicuous consumption and self-
interest. Farmers will not plant extra carrots absent
sufficient demand and a minimum price for them. Unless the
incremental output is exported elsewhere, domestic
consumers must purchase the extra carrots. If consumers are
to be induced to continually acquire more, their desire for
goods and services must remain ungratified: "The higher level
of production has, merely, a higher level of want creation
necessitating a higher level of want satisfaction."2 97 The
benchmark for personal consumption must continually exceed
society's current possessions.298 It follows then that human
behavior must conform to this social goal of increased output:
"the secret of all successful 'socialization' is making the
individuals wish to do what the system needs them to do for it
to reproduce itself."29 9 Thus to increase output of consumer
goods and services, an ethic of conspicuous consumption must
be ingrained, namely "the fallaciousness of resting
satisfied.""' At times, personal consumption becomes a
patriotic duty.3 0
296. STRANGE & BAYLEY, supra note 213, at 79.
297. GALBRAITH, supra note 288, at 129.
298. ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, DOES ETHICS HAVE A CHANCE IN A WORLD OF
CONSUMERS? 169 (2008). As Coco Chanel said: "Luxury is a necessity that
begins where necessity ends." Famous Women and Beauty, Quotes by Coco
Chanel, http://www.famous-women-and-beauty.com/quotes-by-coco-chanel.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
299. Id. at 149.
300. Id. at 148.
301. President Bush, for example, in his first lengthy national address after
the 9-11 attacks, encouraged citizens to continue consuming: "I ask your
continued participation and confidence in the American economy." Pres. George
H.W. Bush, Address to the Nation (Sept. 20, 2001), available at
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To ingrain this consumerism ethic, the government need
not advocate increased consumption per se. It can instead
appeal to self-interest. In appealing to status competition,
one correlates an improved living standard and greater
happiness with an increase in consumption of material goods
and services. For output to continually increase, wealth must
be desired in relative terms (namely, how much one possesses
relative to one's peers), not absolute terms (say possessing a
million dollars). One must also distinguish evidence of
wealth from actual wealth. For output to continually
increase, status must be afforded not to wealth per se, but to
evidence of wealth, which is displayed primarily through
increased conspicuous leisure and consumption. Consumers
on the hedonic treadmill should not seek to outdo their peers'
net worth; otherwise, personal savings, investments, and
frugality would be higher and consumption lower than they
are currently. Instead, to make invidious pecuniary
comparisons, Thorstein Veblen observed, "wealth or power
must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded only on
evidence." °2 Under this zero-sum status competition, every
time others acquire more, I have less, so I need to acquire
more. Envy keeps the hedonic treadmill humming as the
desire to maximize one's reputation through invidious
comparison, like the desire for power or fame, can never be
satiated. Status competition has no ultimate winner, and
besides death, no finish line or satisfactory resting place.3"3
http://newsaic.com/res92001.html. One goal of his 2003 economic agenda was to
"encourage consumer spending that will continue to boost the economic
recovery." The White House, Office of Communications, Fact Sheet: Taking
Action to Strengthen America's Economy (Jan. 7, 2003), available at 2003 WL
42248. In 2005, the White House reported consumer spending growing at a
"healthy rate," up by a "strong 0.8 percent, the biggest increase since July
2004," and "sales of both new and existing homes reached all-time highs, as the
strong housing market continues to be powered by strong job growth and low
interest rates." The White House, Office of Communications, President Bush
Discusses Agenda for Continued Economic Growth (Aug. 9, 2005), available at
2005 WL 1874659.
302. VEBLEN, supra note 259, at 36. Indeed, Veblen predicted that as
communities become larger and have greater turnover as mobility increases,
then the utility of conspicuous consumption will increase relative to conspicuous
leisure. Id. at 86-87.
303. Id. at 32 ("[Slince the struggle is substantially a race for reputability on
the basis of an invidious comparison, no approach to a definitive attainment is
possible."); cf. T.S. Eliot, Ash-Wednesday, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909-1962,
1986 (1991) ("End of the endless / Journey to no end.").
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A governmental policy focused on increasing consumption
and output does not always advance its citizens' welfare.
Instead this policy, at times, promotes (rather than mitigates)
envy, status competition, and individuals' focusing illusion
(i.e., predicting greater happiness from increased wealth and
consumption and not accounting one's adaptation to one's
new living standard). In priming its citizens of the virtues of
self-interest, the governmental policy will torment its
citizens, as there will always be someone richer to envy. In
this arms race scenario, the overall level of happiness
stagnates or decreases. °4 Indeed, although real income per
head (adjusted for inflation) has nearly doubled since 1972,
the percentage of Americans who say they are pretty well
satisfied with their financial situation has fallen. 5
As consumers are implored to increase consumption,
along the way, they too become "commodities on the consumer
and labor markets."3 6  The more citizens are primed of the
importance of self-interest, the more they will be asked to
sacrifice activities that are actually correlated with greater
happiness. As lawyers at large law firms experience, the
significant personal sacrifices generally occur not in the first
2,000 billable hours, but the incremental hours thereafter.
Americans whose family income is equal to, or above,
$100,000, for example, spend more time at work and
commuting30 7 than those with lower family incomes. 08 And
in another study, commuting ranked as the worst activity of
304. Joseph M. Sirgy, Materialism & Quality of Life, 43 SoC. INDICATORS
RES. 227 (1998).
305. LAYARD, supra note 211, at 42.
306. BAUMAN, supra note 298, at 58.
307. Kahneman et al., supra note 210, at 1910.
308. Among wealthy industrialized countries, U.S. workers in 1997 worked
the longest hours-1966 hours per capita, which is four percent longer than the
1883 hours U.S. workers worked in 1980. Press Release, Int'l Labour Org.,
Europeans Work Less Time, but Register Faster Productivity Gains-New ILO
Statistical Volume Highlights Labour Trends Worldwide (Sept. 5, 1999),
http://www.ilo.org/global/About-theILO/Media-and-publicinformation/Press_
releases/lang--en/WCMS_071326/index.htm. The United States' trend was
contrary to a world-wide trend in industrialized countries in which the number
of work hours remained steady or declined. Id. In Norway and Sweden, hours
worked in 1997 were, respectively, 1399 and 1552 per year. Id. According to
the International Labour Organization, Americans work the longest hours
among industrialized countries, with the Japanese second longest. Id.; see also
MISHEL ET AL., supra note 71, at tbl.3.2 (describing trend of increased
productivity and annual working hours between 1967 and 2006).
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the day.30 9
As citizens are told of the importance of self-interest, it
should be unsurprising if they behave selfishly. A
consumerism utopia does not concern itself about caring for
others, wrote sociologist Zygmunt Bauman; the "privatized
utopias of the cowboys and cowgirls of the consumerist era
show instead vastly expanded 'free space' (free for my self, of
course)-a kind of empty space of which the liquid-modern
consumer, bent on solo performances and solo performances
only, never has enough."310 The governmental policy runs the
risk of, not only promoting personally-destructive behavior
and increasing misery, but eroding the social capital
necessary for a market economy.311
B. Other Values, to the Extent They Conflict With Self-
Interest, Are Marginalized
At times, while at the DOJ, I found myself passionately
pursuing antitrust investigations to protect consumers of
snack cakes, white bread, and premium-tier shampoo (which
was priced below salon shampoos and above mid-tier and
value-brand shampoos). Too often, I debated at length with
defense counsel over issues, which in retrospect, may not
have mattered much at all. My colleagues at the FTC were
seeking to protect consumers of smokeless tobacco 312 and
super-premium ice cream.313 We never really questioned the
309. Kahneman & Krueger, supra note 210, at 13 (based on net effect of the
average of three positive and six negative adjectives by 909 working women in
Texas).
310. BAUMAN, supra note 298, at 54.
311. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19-26 (2000); Richard Layard, It Is Time for a
Capitalism Based on Values, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at 15 (noting that a
zero-sum mentality is often counterproductive and does not generally produce a
happy workplace).
312. In FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F. Supp. 2d 151, 153 n.1 (D.D.C. 2000),
Judge Hogan juxtaposed the government's efforts to block a merger in the
chewing tobacco industry on the theory that prices would likely increase post-
merger, with the government's attempt to stem the consumption of tobacco by
increasing the prices through taxes, regulating advertising, and decreasing the
amount of retail shelf-space devoted to this product. The court appreciated the
FTC's explanation that consumption would not likely decline post-merger, but
that consumers would only pay more. Id. Thus, the court saw no health
benefits in permitting the acquisition, and ultimately on antitrust principles,
preliminarily enjoined the transaction. Id.
313. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC to Challenge Nestle, Dreyer's
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conventional wisdom that increases in output were
presumptively good.
Increases in output are often, but not always,
beneficial.314 Take for example resale price maintenance
(RPM)315 of status goods. Antitrust scholars for decades
debated the proper legal standard for evaluating RPM. The
U.S. courts, until recently, condemned RPM as per se illegal,
favoring instead a policy whereby retailers could discount
goods, if they so chose.31 6 Paradoxically, the antitrust laws'
focus on increased price competition and output can be self-
defeating for some luxury goods, eventually making
consumers worse off.
Merger: Agency Will Allege $2.8 Billion Ice Cream Deal Violates Antitrust Laws
(Mar. 4, 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03/dreyers.shtm.
314. The behavioral economics literature is exploring the paradox of choice.
Under neoclassical economic theory, rational consumers would stop searching
for (and demanding) additional variety if the additional choice's marginal
emotional and cognitive costs exceed the marginal benefits. Market forces
would set the optimal amount of choice, as rational consumers will keep
demanding choice until the costs of one additional option outweigh its benefits.
But in reality, additional choice at times can be detrimental, and the market
does not always self-correct. Consumers, when confronted with too many
choices, experience (i) choice/information overload (the presence of more choices
makes decision-makers more likely to avoid choosing; in maintaining the status
quo, consumers forgo potentially superior options which may have negative
consequences for their future well-being); (ii) less confidence/greater
dissatisfaction (when consumer preferences are unclear, the presence of more
choices has been associated with lower confidence and greater dissatisfaction in
choosing and paying more for purchases that make them less happy); and (iii)
negative emotions (when people have to choose among negative outcomes, they
are less satisfied with their decision than when the decision externally
dictated). Simona Botti & Sheena S. Iyengar, The Dark Side of Choice: When
Choice Impairs Social Welfare, 25 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 25, 26-28 (2006);
see also BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE IS LESS (2004).
As for the implications of the paradox of choice on the poor, see Marianne
Bertrand et al., Behavioral Economics & Marketing in Aid of Decision Making
Among the Poor, 25 J. PUB. POLY & MARKETING 8, 12 (2006).
315. Resale price maintenance refers to a manufacturer's or supplier's
practice of "speciffying] the minimum (or maximum) price at which the product
must be re-sold to customers." ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
GLOSSARY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION LAW
75 (1993), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf.
316. The Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS,
Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 895-96 (2007), departed from its ninety-plus year precedent
and held that RPM should evaluated under its rule-of-reason legal standard. To
circumvent the per se prohibition of RPM before Leegin, manufacturers either
could vertically integrate downstream by selling their products from their own
stores or could operate within the narrow channel under United States v.
Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), whereby manufacturers could state their
discounting policy and subsequently terminate those that violate the policy.
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Under the model of conspicuous consumption, it may
make more sense to allow RPM for luxury status goods. The
value of certain luxury goods is in their symbol of
accumulated wealth, not their inherent usefulness to improve
the standard of living.317 Indeed the less useful the item,
Veblen argues, the greater its symbolic value.318  The
manufacturer may agree with retailers on a high retail price
for its luxury goods to maintain the goods' status value.
Retailers cannot discount the luxury items, and are required
to invest some of their margin in promoting a luxurious
"upscale" image .3 9 Early adopters purchase the luxury good
to signal the magnitude of their disposable income (for
example having sufficient discretionary income to expend
over $400 on a silk scarf).
If retail price maintenance is per se illegal, however, then
opportunistic retailers can increase sales by discounting the
luxury item. More consumers can now afford the discounted
luxury good. But similarly, the good's status value is
cheapened. Early adopters eventually disapprove of the
brand's commoditization, and switch to another status
symbol. As consumers in each income group disapprove of
the brand as cheap and vulgar, the manufacturer and
retailers may lower price to maintain demand levels
(primarily among consumers who previously could not afford
the item). Eventually these consumers will find less status
value in the particular silk scarf, which ends up in the thrift
shop. Thus a manufacturer's RPM policy first signals to
consumers its commitment to maintain a high retail price on
its luxury goods, and second can actually slow down the
hedonic treadmill. The item (e.g., Hermes scarf, Rolex watch)
becomes an accepted symbol of conspicuous consumption; a
317. See, e.g., Leslie H. Moeller et al., The Superpremium Premium, 37
STRATEGY + BUS., Winter 2004, at 4-5, available at http://www.strategy-
business.com/media/file/sb37-04401.pdf (discussing how high pricing "helps
maintain the appearance of scarcity" and reinforces product's status).
318. Veblen's theory of waste involved expenditures that do "not serve
human life or human well-being on the whole." VEBLEN, supra note 259, at 97.
Two of his many examples of conspicuous consumption are expensive elegant
clothing that demonstrate "the wearer's abstinence from productive
employment," id. at 171, and fast horses (which are expensive, or wasteful and
useless for industrial purposes). Id. at 142-43.
319. See RONALD N. LAFFERTY ET AL., IMPACT EvALUATIONS OF FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES (1984) (discussing efforts of
Levi Strauss and Florsheim Shoes to use RPM to signal "high quality" image).
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prospective purchaser can be assured that retailer
discounting will not "cheapen" the brand (although piracy
issues remain).
On a macro level, antitrust's per se prohibition of resale
price maintenance can increase the output and consumption
of status symbols. It fuels the continuous cycle of creating
and satisfying new wants by accelerating the cycle of early
adoption, emulation, and ultimately rejection of status
symbols.
If increasing output is the goal, then as Galbraith
observed, "any step to discourage borrowing or buying will be
automatically opposed by the machinery for consumer-
demand creation."32  Other values-to the extent they
conflict-are sacrificed. As one example, the FTC
successfully challenged Detroit-area auto dealers, who agreed
to restrict their showroom hours, including closing on
Saturdays.32' The Detroit-area auto dealers argued, and the
administrative law judge found, that they agreed to close on
Saturdays to accomplish labor peace and in response to union
and salespersons' pressure.3 2 2  There was no evidence,
however, that the Saturday closing actually caused an
increase in auto retail prices in the Detroit area, or that the
hours reductions increased dealers' gross margins.32' Now
suppose the Detroit-area auto dealers wanted to enable their
employees to observe a religious Sabbath. To assure that no
dealer obtained an unfair advantage by remaining open, they
agreed among themselves to close on Saturday or Sunday.
Their agreement would likely violate the antitrust laws.324
Today, religious norms are among the few
counterbalances to self-interest. 25 For many years, the U.S.
320. GALBRAITH, supra note 288, at 170.
321. In re Detroit Auto Dealers Ass'n, Inc., 955 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1992).
322. Id. at 460.
323. Id. at 471 n.13. Although the court did not equate limitation of hours to
price-fixing, it found no error in the FTC's conclusion that controlling hours of
operation in this business is a means of competition, and that this limitation
may be an unreasonable restraint of trade. Id. at 472.
324. At some point, the activity may not involve "trade or commerce" under
the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Proctor v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 651 F. Supp. 1505, 1524 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (holding the Sherman Act
inapplicable to distribution of religious literature).
325. For example, senior clergy of the seven largest Protestant
denominations, according to a 2008 survey, expressed many social concerns: (i)
seventy-eight percent agreed that the federal government should do more to
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had state laws that restricted labor and certain commercial
activity on Sunday. As these Sunday Blue laws326 have fallen
to the wayside-especially when people can consume at any
hour on cable shopping channels or the Internet-Sundays
(and nearly all major religious holidays) have become
ordinary days to labor and consume. But this repeal had
attendant effects aside from increasing the opportunity to
consume, and thereby increase output. States where Sunday
Blue laws were repealed, according to one study, experienced
a fifteen percent decline in attendance among weekly
churchgoers and a nearly twenty-five percent drop in
donations.327 "I'm surprised [religious conservatives] haven't
picked up on this," said one of the study's coauthors. 328 "Just
like people switch cars when gas goes up, this is a change in
the price of going to church; you've got an opportunity cost,
you can do something else instead, and that has changed
behavior. "329 Reducing church attendance has had other
negative effects. Robert Putnam noted that "[Iflaith
communities in which people worship together are arguably
the single most important repository of social capital in
America."330 In a 2008 study, several economists found a one
solve social problems, such as unemployment, poverty and poor housing, and
more than forty percent strongly agree; (ii) sixty-seven percent of the clergy
agreed that the government should guarantee health insurance for all citizens,
even if it means raising taxes; (iii) sixty-nine percent said that more
environmental protection is needed, even if it raises prices or costs jobs; and (iv)
over eighty percent said they publicly expressed their views about hunger and
poverty often in the last year, and three quarters said they addressed marriage
and family issues often. Press Release, Public Religion Research, Broadest Ever
Survey Gives in Depth Portrait of Mainline Clergy (Mar. 6, 2009),
http://www.publicreligion.orgobjects/uploads/fck/file/Clergy%2OReportCVS%20
press%20release%20%2003-06-09%2OFinal.pdf.
326. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422, 432-40 (1961)
(outlining history of Sunday Closing laws or Sunday Blue laws, which with
various exceptions, "generally proscribe all labor, business and other
commercial activities on Sunday").
327. Jonathan Gruber & Daniel M. Hungerman, The Church Versus the Mall:
What Happens when Religion Faces Increased Secular Competition?, 123 Q. J.
ECON. 831, 844, 848 (2008).
328. Justin Ewers, Blue Laws: Easing Up on Sunday Liquor Sales, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., July 8, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/
national/2008/07/08/easing-up-on-sunday-liquor-sales.html.
329. Id. The article also quotes David Laband, author of Blue Laws: The
History, Economics, and Politics of Sunday-Closing Laws: "All of these repeal
efforts are related to economics now. . . . There's no vestige of a religious
component anymore." Id.
330. PUTNAM, supra note 311, at 66.
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percent drop in overall voter turnout (which affected more
Democratic than Republican vote shares) after the state
repealed its Sunday Blue law.331 This finding confirmed the
earlier economic literature correlating church attendance
with voter turnout. 32 The authors also noted the other
evidence correlating church attendance to (i) lower levels of
criminal activity, (ii) lower rates of substance abuse, (iii)
better health status and outcomes, (iv) improved self-reported
measures of well-being, and (v) greater marital stability. 33
C. To Increase Consumption, Privacy May Be Sacrificed
Companies presumably employ optimal marketing
programs to increase sales.334 But technological advances
now enable consumers to bypass advertisements in
traditional print and television media. To maintain and
increase output, companies must identify those particular
consumers most susceptible to the sales pitch, and target
them with a personalized message to induce them to
consume. Marketing thus will become more invasive and
individually targeted.
To better target consumers with advertising, marketers
will increasingly rely upon vast amounts of data on individual
consumers' purchasing behavior. One data collecting
company, Acxiom, reportedly has consumer data on more
than 195 million Americans, and employs, according to its
website, "a household-level segmentation system that clusters
U.S. households into one of [seventy] segments within
[twenty-one] life stage groups based on specific consumer
behavior and demographic characteristics," which includes
"access to critical information such as which competitors they
shop, product usage, media preferences, attitudes toward
advertising, interests and expenditures-both nationally and
331. Alan Gerber et al., Does Church Attendance Cause People to Vote? Using
Blue Laws' Repeal to Estimate the Effect of Religiosity on Voter Turnout 2 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14303, 2008), available at
httpJ/www.nber.org/papers/wl4303.pdf.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 3-4 (collecting studies).
334. POSNER, supra note 24, at 109 ("Increased sophistication in the
marketing of goods and services enabled sellers to induce consumers to shift
much of their savings, designed to protect their future consumption, into buying
more consumer goods now.").
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at a local market level."335 Credit rating agency Equifax, for
example, advertises "'advanced profiling techniques' to
identify people who show a 'statistical propensity to acquire
new credit' within [ninety] days."336
Neuromarketing, which studies consumer brain activity
to advertising messages, will also increase.3 3' As one
neuromarketing firm that studied consumer responses to
online and offline coupons stated, "companies now know the
critical differences in subconscious responses across the
categories that determine behavior, so they can make the
most fully-informed strategic marketing decisions when it
comes to couponing. "338
In this endeavor to increase consumption, every age
group including children will be increasingly targeted with
individualized advertising messages. For example, Procter &
Gamble's marketing unit, Tremor, enlists teenagers to build
word-of-mouth advocacy for its products. 339  Discretionary
spending by U.S. children aged three to eleven is "expected to
grow from $18 billion in 2005 to over $21 billion by 2010,
while families will spend over $140 billion on consumer goods
for their kids by 2010. "134 0
The United States today lacks a coordinated policy in
335. PersonicX, Benefits of Market Segmentation-Demographic
Segmentation, http://www.personicx.com/what is/default.aspx (last visited Jan.
12, 2010); PersonicX, PersonicX and Consumer Research Data Sources,
http://www.personicx.com/products/research/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 12,
2010).
336. Brad Stone, Banks Mine Data and Woo Troubled Borrowers, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/business/
22target.html?_r=1.
337. Cecily Hall & Valerie Seckler, Brands Pick Consumers' Brains--and
Scan Them, WWD RETAIL, Oct. 14, 2009, at 8, available at
http://www.wwd.com/retail-news/brands-pick-consumers-brains-and-scan-them-
2342437 ("The testing and use of neuromarketing ha[ve] roughly doubled [in
2009], compared with 2008, among the world's 100 biggest brands . . .");
Paul Root Wolpe, Is My Mind Mine?: How Neuroimaging Will Affect
Personal Freedom, FORBES, Oct. 9, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/10/09/
neuroimaging-neuroscience-mind-reading-opinions-contributors-paul-root-
wolpe.html.
338. Helen Leggatt, Neuro-Marketing Firm Measures Consumer Response to
Coupons, BIZREPORT, Apr. 28, 2009, http'//www.bizreport.com/2009/04/neuro-
marketing-firmmeasures consumerresponse to coupons.html.
339. Richard H. Levey, Customer Relationship Management: P&G Relies
on Teens for Viral Marketing, DIRECT MAG., Aug. 1, 2003,
http://directmag.com/mag/marketing-pg-reliesteens.
340. STRANGE & BAYLEY, supra note 213, at 79.
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protecting privacy. Different federal and state laws protect
different information in different industries to different
degrees. Although the FTC has taken an increased interest
in behavioral marketing,34' the current state and federal laws
are not a significant barrier to more intrusive marketing.
Nor can the government adequately protect these privacy
interests if maximizing consumption is its aim.
D. Maximizing Output Requires More Makeovers
Thomas Merton observed over sixty years ago:
We live in a society whose whole policy is to excite every
nerve of the human body and keep it at the highest pitch
of artificial tension, to strain every human desire to the
limit and to create as many new desires and synthetic
passions as possible, in order to cater to them with the
products of our factories and printing presses and movie
studios and all the rest.34 2
Marketing is no longer limited to paid advertisements,
product placements, and stealth advertising. Some television
programs today propagate Veblen's conspicuous consumption;
the more television people watch, the more they overestimate
others' affluence, and the more they spend.343
To increase demand, marketers can seek to alter
prevailing norms, such as soft-drink producers promoting
soda consumption in the morning.4 4 But there comes a point
when consumers reach the actual or perceived optimal
341. See FED. TRADE COMM'N STAFF REPORT, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES
FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: TRACKING, TARGETING, AND
TECHNOLOGY (Feb. 2009). But FTC Commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour said
in her concurring statement:
This staff report, while commendable, focuses too narrowly ....
Threats to consumer privacy abound, both online and offline, and
behavioral advertising represents just one aspect of a multifaceted
privacy conundrum surrounding data collection and use. I would prefer
that the Commission take a more comprehensive approach to privacy,
and evaluate behavioral advertising within that broader context.
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Concurring Statement of Commissioner
Pamela Jones Harbour Regarding Staff Report: Self-Regulatory Principles for
Online Behavioral Advertising (Feb. 12, 2009), httpJ/www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/02/
behavad.shtm.
342. THOMAS MERTON, THE SEVEN STOREY MOUNTAIN 148 (1998).
343. LAYARD, supra note 211, at 89.
344. Wake Up and Smell the Cola, NATL POST (Can.), July 24, 2007,
http://www.canada.com/topics/bodyandhealtbstory.html?id=34ad64f0-eO74-
4alb-ad9a-2a656687c343.
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number of goods (such as a sufficient number of television
sets to accommodate every household member and potential
guests) or level of services (such as the number of haircuts
per month). To increase consumption further, consumers
must be primed to makeover-to continually reinvent their
homes, lifestyles, and physical appearances to comport with
the latest trend. It is no longer replacing last year's fashions
with this year's. Everything, including our physical
appearance, is subject to makeovers.
New physical appearances can accompany new
wardrobes, cars, homes, and consumer goods. Although the
majority of Botox consumers are women between thirty-five
and fifty, according to a study by the American Society for
Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, patients between nineteen and
thirty-four now account for fourteen percent of Botox users
nationwide. 5 Hair dyes are marketed to project a new and
better image. L'Or6al modified its slogan "Because I'm worth
it" to "Because you're worth it" after concerns that the
original appeared too money-oriented and self-centered.346
But as one company executive stated, "[alt the end of the day,
we make people feel good, we build up their confidence."4 7
The company is designing products to offer consumers in
Africa "something they may not have thought they needed,
such as an oscillating mascara wand."348
As governmental policies prime consumers to pursue
their self-interest, then consumers are expected-when given
the choice-to invest in themselves. Rational consumers are
presumed to know what is in their self-interest, and thus are
free within certain legal bounds to pursue their self-interest.
Because people enjoy this freedom, their fate is presumed to
345. Courtney Perkes, The Young Face of Botox, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,
July 1, 2008, http//www.ocregister.com/articles/botox-says-neal-2080995-young-
really.
346. Angelique Chrisafis, You're Worth It-if White. L'Orgal Guilty of Racism:
Cosmetic Giant Fined for Recruitment Campaign in Paris, GUARDIAN
(U.K.), July 7, 2007, httpJ/www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jul/07/
france.angeliquechrisafis; Karen McVeigh et al., Because They're Worth It:
High-tech Cosmetics Giant L'Oreal is Making Eyes at Body Shop, TIMES
(London), Feb. 24, 2006, at 3, available at http'/business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/
business/industry-sectors/retailing/article734423.ece.
347. Nicola Mawson, L'Ordal Sets Its Sights on the African Woman, BUS.
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arise from the consequences of their choices. Since consumers
today have the choice of remaking their physical appearance,
any shortcoming in their appearance represents a choice (and
failing) by those consumers. In the world where self-
interested consumers can continually remake themselves, one
has only oneself to blame if unattractive, poor, or sick. The
government is not responsible for one's poverty, because it
operates outside the marketplace.
E. Attitudes Toward Those Not Conforming to the Norm of
Self-Interest Change
In visiting Greece recently, my children were aghast at
some of ancient Sparta's social policies. Unlike ancient
Athens, with its literature, art, philosophy, and architecture,
Sparta focused on perfecting its militaristic strength.349
Accordingly, a father brought his newborn child to the elder
men of his tribe. If the baby was considered "puny and
deformed," they threw the baby into the Apothetae "the place
of rejection" by Mount Taygetus.5 ° Sparta's infanticide policy
may seem barbaric today, but the individual behavior
conformed to a prevailing societal goal: if the child was poorly
endowed for health or strength, values which this militaristic
society prized, then Spartans considered it better for the state
and child for the child to die.
As governmental policies increasingly value self-interest,
consumption, and increased output, there will be greater
"contempt for all interests which do not contribute obviously
to economic activity."3 51 If status is determined by evidence of
wealth, then people accordingly will "bend their energies to
live up to that ideal."3 2 Rather than temper the passion for
wealth, a You're-on-Your-Own policy promotes conspicuous
consumption. Much like the message to summer law
associates who dine at a law partner's extravagant home,
evidence of conspicuous consumption serves as an
349. THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE To THE
PELOPONNESIAN WAR 8-9 (Robert B. Strassler ed., 1996) [hereinafter
PELOPONNESIAN WAR] (contrasting Athens with Sparta, which was not adorned
with "magnificent temples and public edifices"); PLUTARCH ON SPARTA 28
(Richard J.A. Talbert trans., 1988).
350. PLUTARCH ON SPARTA, supra note 349, at 27.
351. R.H. TAWNEY, THE ACQUISITIVE SOCIETY 46 (2004).
352. VEBLEN, supra note 259, at 84.
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inducement for the undertaking and its accompanying
sacrifices. The message also implies that those who end up in
more modest homes driving less expensive cars somehow fell
short along the way. If evidence of wealth is prized, those
who jumped off the hedonic treadmill will enjoy low status. If
rationality is defined as self-interested behavior, then the
religious clergy, despite leading the pack in happiness and job
satisfaction, are behaving irrationally and easier to
marginalize. A life devoted to charity and community
interest becomes anachronistic.
Although a You're-on-Your-Own Society may view social
workers and the clergy as eccentric but harmless, its attitude
toward the poor hardens. As Galbraith wrote, increasing
"aggregate output leaves a self-perpetuating margin of
poverty at the very base of the income pyramid,"3 3 but "the
competitive model had no place for individuals who, as the
result of age, infirmity, industrial injury or congenital
incompetence, had only a low or negligible marginal
productivity."354 The mentally ill, the infirm, or those too
feeble to work must depend on whatever fragile support
systems exist. 355
A society's wisdom is not solely in its ingenious ways to
create wealth, but in its attitudes toward poverty and wealth
and its actions regarding both. For Pericles's Athens, wealth
was employed "more for use than for show," and Athens
placed "the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact
but in declining the struggle against it."3 56 In the spirit of the
1960s, Pope John XXIII struck the same theme:
[T]he economic prosperity of any people is to be assessed
not so much from the sum total of goods and wealth
possessed as from the distribution of goods according to
norms of justice, so that everyone in the community can
develop and perfect himself. For this, after all, is the end
toward which all economic activity of a community is by
nature ordered.357
353. GALBRAITH, supra note 288, at 79.
354. Id. at 35.
355. J. Pierre Loebel, Completed Suicide in Late Life, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES,
Mar. 2005, at 260, available at http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.orgcgi/
reprint/56/3/260.pdf (discussing why the rate of completed suicide among older
persons is the highest of any age group in the United States).
356. PELOPONNESIAN WAR, supra note 349, at 113.
357. Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT:
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Similarly Robert F. Kennedy in 1968 said,
But even if we act to erase material poverty, there is
another greater task, it is to confront the poverty of
satisfaction-purpose and dignity-that afflicts us all.
Too much and for too long, we seemed to have surrendered
personal excellence and community values in the mere
accumulation of material things. Our Gross National
Product, now, is over $800 billion dollars a year, but that
Gross National Product-if we judge the United States of
America by that-that Gross National Product counts air
pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to
clear our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for
our doors and the jails for the people who break them. It
counts the destruction of the redwood and the loss of our
natural wonder in chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and
counts nuclear warheads and armored cars for the police
to fight the riots in our cities. It counts Whitman's rifle
and Speck's knife, and the television programs which
glorify violence in order to sell toys to our children. Yet
the gross national product does not allow for the health of
our children, the quality of their education or the joy of
their play. It does not include the beauty of our poetry or
the strength of our marriages, the intelligence of our
public debate or the integrity of our public officials. It
measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our
wisdom nor our learning, neither our compassion nor our
devotion to our country, it measures everything in short,
except that which makes life worthwhile. And it can tell
us everything about America except why we are proud
that we are Americans.
358
But in a You're-on-Your-Own society, aiding the poor is
rational only if one financially benefits thereby. Moreover,
under a zero-sum mentality, improving the poor's living
standard represents the loss of power and prestige of those in
the adjoining income bracket. If the homeless do not
contribute to greater productivity, then self-interested
taxpayers, who can privately insure for catastrophic events,
should have little interest in helping them. The belief that all
citizens should benefit equitably from the increase in national
THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 96 (David J. O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds.,
2004).
358. Robert F. Kennedy, Remarks at the University of Kansas (Mar. 18,
1968), available at httpJ/www.jfldibrary.orgHistorica+Resources/Archives/
Reference+Desk/Speeches/RFK/RFKSpeech68Marl8UKansas.htm.
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wealth is marginalized. Indeed, the hypothesis is that
assisting the poor with tax dollars will diminish the self-
interested taxpayers' incentives to maximize wealth.
As governmental policies prime citizens of the
importance of self-interest, then even those inclined toward
strong reciprocity and conditional cooperation will have
negative perceptions toward the poor. 59  Welfare will
increasingly represent, regardless of the empirical evidence,
the poor pursuing their self-interest in shirking work.
Taxpayer "handouts" to the poor will represent less personal
consumption for wealthier taxpayers.3 60 Thus, it will appear
that the real disgrace of poverty is not in the failure of
society's safety net but in the poor themselves, in either their
selfishness or the repercussions of some individual character
defect (in not offering society a service that commands a
salary above the poverty level). Alberto Alesina and Edward
L. Glaeser report a divergence of Americans' and Europeans'
belief in the poor as lazy 361 or trapped in poverty, 362 and the
reality. 63 President Ronald Reagan, for example:
[Over five years] told the story of the "Chicago welfare
queen" who had [eighty] names, [thirty] addresses,
[twelve] Social Security cards, and collected benefits for
"four nonexisting deceased husbands," milking the
government out of "over $150,000." The real welfare
recipient to whom Reagan referred was actually convicted
for using two different aliases to collect $8000. Reagan
continued to use his version of the story even after the
press pointed out the actual facts of the case to him.364
359. Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 109, at 168.
360. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-75, pt. 1, at 417 (1995), available at
http'J/frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_congreports&docid=f:hrO75pl.104.pdf (discussing
increased disparagement against welfare recipients); Janine Jackson & Laura
Flanders, Public Enemy Number One?: Media's Welfare Debate Is a War on Poor
Women, FAIR, May/June 1995, httpJ/www.fair.org/index.php?page=1303.
361. ALBERTO ALESINA & EDWARD L. GLAESER, FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE
U.S. AND EUROPE: A WORLD OF DIFFERENCE 183-84 (2004) (stating that sixty
percent of Americans believe the poor are lazy versus twenty-six percent of
Europeans).
362. Id. at 184 (finding that twenty-nine percent of Americans believe the
poor are trapped in poverty versus sixty percent of Europeans who hold this
belief).
363. Id. at 60-68 (finding that the American poor generally work harder, and
have a lower probability of exiting poverty, than the European poor).
364. The Mendacity Index: Which President Told the Biggest Whoppers? You
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Income inequality and poverty simply cease to preoccupy the
self-interested citizens' mind. 6
F. To Increase Consumption, the Debt Economy Must Grow
"[E]very increase in consumption," Galbraith predicted,
"will bring a further increase-possibly a more than
proportional one-in consumer debt."366  In promoting self-
interest and consumption, one has to consider as well the
costs of a debt economy.
Consumer indebtedness over the past thirty years has
increased significantly.367 If consumers act rationally toward
debt and spending, increased debt is unremarkable. A few
consumers may default in predicting incorrectly, but most
rational consumers pursuing their self-interest would incur
the optimal debt level. Moreover, debt to acquire an
appreciating asset (such as a home mortgage) can have a
disciplinary effect on otherwise discretionary income.
But the behavioral experiments show how consumers,
unlike their rational wealth-maximizing counterparts, suffer
heuristics in trading off spending in the short-term versus
saving for the long-term: "consumers tend to underestimate
the opportunity cost of current consumption." 368 Plus
consumers are willing to spend more if they have a credit
card.369
Leading up to the financial crisis, the credit card
industry substantially increased its advertising spending and
solicitations. 3 ° There were in recent years more than four
Decide, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 2003, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/
features/2003/0309.mendacity-index.html.
365. GALBRAITH, supra note 288, at 69-73.
366. Id. at 146.
367. Federal Reserve Statistical Release: Consumer Credit,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/gl9/hist/cc-histsa.html (last visited
Dec. 31, 2009).
368. Victor Stango & Jonathan Zinman, Exponential Growth Bias and
Household Finance (2 Tuck School of Bus., Working Paper No. 2008-41, 2008),
available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=1081633; see also THALER, supra note 96,
at 107-21; Rabin, supra note 88, at 670-71.
369. AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 78, at 128; THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 78, at 143.
370. In 2004, for example, on average three quarters of U.S. households
received every month nearly six offers for a credit card, "even though response
rates for those offers were at 0.3% compared with 0.9% in 2000." Fouad H.
Nader, The Credit Card Industry 6 (Adrenale Corporation, Background Paper
No. 15, 2005), httpJ/www.upu.int/news-centre2005/en/paper2005-08-
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credit cards for every man, woman, and child in the United
States.371 The percentage of Americans across age categories
who carry a balance-and incur financing charges and
interest payments-on their credit cards has increased. 72
For example, between 1970 and 2004, the percentage of
Americans under the age of twenty with a credit card
increased from two percent to thirty-seven percent, as did the
percentage of those carrying a balance on their credit card
(from twenty-seven percent to sixty-one percent). This same
trend affected U.S. families.373
Americans are deeper in debt.3 74  The percentage of
household disposable income spent on debt service has
increased.373  Credit card debt, according to the Federal
Reserve, increased twenty-five percent in the past decade,
reaching $963 billion in January 2009.376 U.S. consumers pay
approximately fifteen billion dollars annually in penalty
fees,377 and the "average outstanding credit card debt for
households that have a card was $10,679 at the end of
2008."371 Although debit cards have increased in popularity,
15_pitney-bowesl5_en.pdf. Since then, credit card solicitations have declined.
According to one estimate, in the first quarter of 2009, U.S. credit card issuers
sent fewer than 500 million offers, which represented the lowest quarterly total
recorded since 2000. Press Release, Mintel Comperemedia, Americans Turn
Away From Credit Cards (May 7, 2009), http://www.comperemedia.com/
press releases/522.
371. AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 78, at 128.
372. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS ON PRACTICES OF THE CONSUMER CREDIT INDUSTRY IN SOLICITING
AND EXTENDING CREDIT AND THEIR EFFECTS ON CONSUMER DEBT AND
INSOLVENCY 9 (June 2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
rptcongress/bankruptcy/bankruptcybillstudy200606.pdf.
373. Between 1970 and 2004, the percentage of U.S. families with a credit
card increased from sixteen percent to seventy-one percent, as did the
percentage of those carrying a balance on their credit card (from thirty-seven
percent to fifty-six percent). Id.
374. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., MONETARY POLICY
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 9 (2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/
monetarypolicy/files/20080227_mprfullreport.pdf.
375. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Series: TDSP, Household Debt
Service Payments as a Percent of Disposable Personal Income,
http:/research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/TDSP (last visited Dec. 31, 2009).
376. Michael McAuliffe, Credit Card Debt Poses Risks For Consumers
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consumers paid in 2009 a record $38.5 billion in overdraft
fees, nearly double the amount reported in 2000.1"9 Between
1997 and 2007, household debt increased from sixty-six
percent to one hundred percent of U.S. GDP.3 80
In 2005, for the first time since the Great Depression, the
U.S. Department of Commerce reported a negative personal
savings rate.38 1 The government-calculated average personal
ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 1, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/0430/
house-passes-credit-card-_n_194126.html. During the financial crisis, the major
U.S. banks raised fees further. Eric Dash, Bank Fees Rise as Lenders Try to
Offset Losses, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2009, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/02/business/02fees.html. To increase the
salience of finance charges, section 201(a) of the Credit Card Accountability
Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, House Bill 627-11 ("Credit CARD Act
of 2009"), requires a "Minimum Payment Warning" along the lines that making
only the minimum payment will increase the amount of interest you pay and
the time it takes to repay your balance. H.R. 627, 111th Cong (2009), available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hl 11-627.
379. Saskia Scholtes & Francesco Guerrera, Banks in $38.5bn Windfall from
Fees, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ecca5750-8545-llde-
9a64-00144feabdc0.html. Ninety-three percent of the overdraft revenues come
from about fourteen percent of the U.S. bank accounts, with the larger banks
charging the highest fees. Ron Lieber & Andrew Martin, The Card Game:
Overspending on Debit Cards Is a Boon for Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, at
Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/09/your-money/credit-and-
debit-cards/09debit.html. For credit-card accounts, the Credit CARD Act of
2009 changes the default option. See Credit Card Accountability Responsibility
and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 102(a), 123 Stat. 1734, 1738-
39. Under the Act, the credit card company cannot impose an over-the-limit fee
for any extension of credit in excess of the previously-authorized credit limit
unless the consumer expressly opted-in to the overdraft plan. Id. This
provision, like many other provisions of the Act, takes effect in February 2010.
See id. § 3, 123 Stat. at 1735. The behavioral economics literature predicts that
such changes in default options can directly influence the outcome. Cass R.
Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003). This change in default options may prove an
interesting natural experiment for the behavioral economists.
380. Martin Wolf, Why Dealing With the Huge Debt Overhang Is So Difficult,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at 9.
381. U.S. Savings Rate Hits Lowest Level Since 1933: Consumers
Depleting Savings to Buy Cars, Other Big-Ticket Items, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
30, 2006, http'//www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11098797. However, comparing the
government's current estimates of personal savings rate to that in earlier
decades warrants caution as the government definition and methods of
calculating personal savings changed over the years. U.S. Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://faq.bea.gov/cgi-bin/bea.cfg/php/enduser/std-adp.php?p-faqid=512&p-
created=1236954941 (last visited Dec. 31, 2009). Also the current government
measurement of personal savings reflects the portion of personal income that
remains after personal current taxes and outlays for personal consumption
expenditures, nonmortgage interest payments, and net current transfers to the
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savings rate between 1959 and 1984 trended upward, but
steadily declined over the years (although it has been
increasing after August 2008).3s2
As Galbraith observed, "[aill crises have involved debt
that, in one fashion or another, has become dangerously out
of scale in relation to the underlying means of payment."3 '
Between 1987 and 2006 (during Alan Greenspan's tenure as
chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board), public and private
debt in the United States quadrupled from $10.5 to forty-
three trillion dollars.2" While stable between 1952 and 1984,
the percentage of total credit market debt as a share of U.S.
GDP significantly increased thereafter." 5 By 2007, public
and private debt was three times greater than that year's
GDP, which exceeded the prior record set in 1933. The ratio
of U.S. public and private debt to GDP was 358 percent in the
third quarter of 2008, the highest in U.S. history.3 6 As the
chief investment strategist at Raymond James & Associates
said:
The "crack cocaine" of our generation appears to be debt.
government and the rest of the world. So the government personal savings
measure, as one example, excludes capital gains. For one estimate of
alternative measures of personal savings and related concepts, see MARSHALL
B. REINSDORF, ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF PERSONAL SAVING, SURVEY OF
CURRENT BUSINESS (2007), http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2007/02%2OFebruary/
0207_saving.pdf.
382. Although changes in the way the government calculates the personal
savings rate warrant caution in comparing rates over time, the government
figures generally reflect first an upward trend: the personal savings rate
averaged 7.98percent between 1959 and 1964, 8.48 percent between 1965 and
1969, 9.91 percent between 1970 and 1974, 9.28 percent between 1975 and
1979, and 10.05 percent between 1980 and 1984. See Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, Download Data for Series: PSAVERT, Personal Savings Rate,
httpJ/research.stlouisfed.orgfred2/series/PSAVERT/downloaddata?cid=112(last
visited Feb. 7, 2010) (averaging the "personal saving rate" column). Thereafter,
the personal savings rate steadily declined: of 3.6 percent. See id. Similarly
when the Department of Commerce used a consistent measure to calculate the
personal saving rate, this rate reflected a downtrend since the early 1990s. U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Frequently Asked
Questions, httpJ/faq.bea.gov/cgi-bin/bea.cfg/php/enduser/std-adp.php?p faqid=
512&pcreated=123695494 (last visited Dec. 31, 2009).
383. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, A SHORT HISTORY OF FINANCIAL EUPHORIA
20 (1993); see also POSNER, supra note 24, at 48 (noting how a highly leveraged
lender lending to a highly leveraged borrower is "courting financial disaster").
384. KEVIN PHILLIPS, BAD MONEY: RECKLESS FINANCE, FAILED POLITICS,
AND THE GLOBAL CRISIS OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM 5 (2008).
385. Id. at 7.
386. Wolf, supra note 380, at 9.
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We just can't seem to get enough of it. And, every time it
looks like the U.S. consumer may be approaching his
maximum tolerance level, somebody figures out how to
lever on even more debt using some new and more
complex financing. For years, I have watched this
levering up process, often noting that it was taking an
ever increasing amount of debt to produce a dollar's worth
of GDP growth.38 7
Marketing campaigns in part spurred this increase in
debt. Besides inundating consumers with credit offers,
lenders changed the perception toward debt. For example,
while growing up, I often brought the monthly payment for
my parents' thirty-year fixed mortgage to our neighborhood
bank, where my parents had a Christmas savings account,
and my sister and I had school savings accounts. To my
recollection, the bank neither advertised nor promoted a
second mortgage, which had a negative connotation. But as
the New York Times chronicled, banks in the 1980s enlisted
advertising staff from packaged goods companies like General
Mills and General Foods to repackage debt into something
socially acceptable and desirable. The banks spent billions
relabeling "second mortgage," which, commented a former
Citicorp executive, sounded "like hocking your house" to the
"more innocent" equity access.388 Thereafter, the output of
second mortgages increased. Many consumers "unlocked" the
equity from their homes, and the amount of outstanding
home-equity loans increased from one billion dollars in the
early 1980s to over one trillion.389
Accompanying greater debt are record delinquency
rates.3 90 As of 2008, delinquencies on home equity loans were
387. PHILLIPS, supra note 384, at 1 (quoting Jeff Saut, chief investment
strategist, Raymond James & Associates, September 2007).
388. Louise Story, Home Equity Frenzy Was a Bank Ad Come True, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 15, 2008, at Al.
389. Id.
390. The delinquency rate for the American Bankers Association's consumer
loan composite ratio, which tracks eight closed-end installment loan categories,
rose in the fourth quarter of 2008 to its highest level since the ABA began
tracking it in the mid-1970s. Press Release, Am. Bankers Ass'n, Consumer
Delinquencies Continue Rising as Recession Intensifies in Fourth Quarter 2008:
ABA Composite Ratio Hits New Record High (Apr. 2, 2009),
http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/040209DelinquencyBulletin.htm. That record,
however, was broken the next quarter. In the first quarter of 2009, the home
equity loan delinquencies increased to 3.52 percent of all accounts, a new
record; home equity lines of credit delinquencies also reached a new record-
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forty-five percent higher than the average rate since 1990,
and the portion of Americans whose home equity lines were
more than thirty days past due was fifty-five percent higher
than the average.391 Counties in the U.S. with high mortgage
delinquency rates in 2008 also tended to have high credit card
delinquency rates.392 Bankruptcy filings have increased.393
In Nevada alone, bankruptcy filings in October 2008 were up
seventy percent compared to filings in October 2007.19'
Moreover, the average family filing for bankruptcy in 2007
was burdened with more debt than typical bankruptcy filers
in 2001: twenty-one percent more in secured debt (e.g.,
mortgages and car debt) and forty-four percent more in
unsecured debt (e.g., credit cards). 395 The number of debtor
cases filed in New York City's Civil Court tripled between
2000 and 2008; court officials estimated that 350,000 cases in
2008 would involve debt or credit cards. 396
A debt-servicing economy has attendant costs. To entice
consumers (including those with limited financial means) to
1.89 percent overall. While credit card delinquencies increased to 4.75 percent
of all accounts (just off the record of 4.81 percent set in 2005), the balances on
those delinquent accounts rose to 6.6 percent of the value of all outstanding
bank card debt, which itself is a new record. Press Release, Am. Bankers Ass'n,
Consumer Delinquencies Rise Again in First Quarter 2009: Composite ratio
inches higher, sets new record (July 7, 2009), http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/
070709DelinquencyBulletin.htm.
391. Story, supra note 388.
392. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Bank Cards and
Mortgage Delinquency Maps Second Quarter 2008 (Nov. 25, 2008),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/regional_outreach/2008/an081125.
html ("[Clounties' bank card and mortgage delinquency rates were moderately
positively correlated (correlation coefficient of +0.37)."). For the twelve months
ending in June 2008, the Federal Reserve study found "bank credit card [sixty-
plus] day delinquency rates increased in [sixty] percent of US counties covered
(1,715 of the 2,837 counties covered) and mortgage [ninety-plus] day
delinquency rates increased in [seventy-four] percent of US counties covered
(2,106 counties)." Id.
393. Bankruptcy filings totaled 108,595 in October 2008, an average of 4,936
bankruptcies filed each business day. This was nearly 34 percent higher than
the average for October 2007. Tara Siegel Bernard & Jenny Anderson,





396. Jim Dwyer, In Civil Court, One Nation, Under Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
11, 2008, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com2008/10/11/nyregion/
llabout.html.
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acquire more debt to consume more goods and services, some
companies resort to deceptive practices.397 Federal and state
agencies, as a result, must respond to increasing consumer
complaints involving debt. For example, six of the top twenty
consumer complaints reported to the FTC in 2008 related to
the issuance or collection of debt.398 Similarly, consumer
complaints about debt issuance, collection, and credit reports
and repair are on many state attorney general offices' top-ten
lists of consumer complaints. 99
To deter fraud and promote consumers' informed use of
credit, the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)400 mandates certain
397. For example, in recent Congressional testimony, an FTC official
described his agency's efforts to combat deceptive advertising with both
a proliferation of advertising outlets and "a proliferation of products
and services and a parallel burgeoning of advertising claims about how
these products will make us thinner, better looking, and healthier; improve
the quality of our lives; make us richer; and even improve our environment."
Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Statement on Advertising Trends and
Consumer Protection Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection,
Product Safety, and Insurance of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, United States Senate 1 (July 22, 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/testimony/090722advertisingtestimony.pdf. The deceptive
advertising practices included "health and safety claims" (advertising claims for
weight loss, cold prevention, improved concentration, and diabetes and cancer
"cures"), the use of "endorsements and testimonials, environmental marketing
or 'green' claims, and advertising that preys on victims of the economic
downturn." Id. at 2.
398. These consisted of (i) identity theft (of which credit card fraud was the
largest component) (twenty-six percent and top complaint overall), (ii) third-
party and creditor debt collection (nine percent-second overall), (iii) credit
bureaus, information furnishers and report users (three percent-sixth overall),
(iv) banks and lenders (two percent-ninth overall), (v) advance-fee loans and
credit protection/repair (one percent-fourteenth overall), and (vi) credit cards
(one percent-eighteenth overall). Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC
Releases List of Top Consumer Complaints in 2008 (Feb. 26, 2009), available at
http:J/www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/02/2008cmpts.shtm.
399. See, e.g., CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK, DATA BOOK FOR JAN.-DEC.
2008 18-68 (2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sentinel/reports/sentinel-
annual-reports/sentinel-cy2008.pdf; Health Care Tops N.C. Consumer
Complaints, CHARLOTTE Bus. J., Apr. 1, 2009, httpJ/www.bizjournals.com/
charlotte/stories/2009/03/30/daily30.html; Washington State Office of the
Attorney General, 2008 Top Consumer Complaints, httpJ/www.atg.wa.gov/
FileAComplaint/ropComplaints.aspx.
400. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006) ("[Elconomic stabilization would be enhanced
and the competition among the various financial institutions and other firms
engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the
informed use of credit. The informed use of credit results from an awareness of
the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose of this subchapter to assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to
compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the
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disclosures of the costs in acquiring debt. Despite the TILA's
myriad disclosure provisions, lenders, brokers, and home
improvement contractors still use high fee and high interest-
rate home equity mortgages to mislead unsophisticated, low-
income homeowners. To deter unscrupulous lending
practices, Congress enacted the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA).4 °1 But TILA and HOEPA
were criticized as ineffective in deterring the predatory
lending and other abuses in the recent financial crisis. 40 2 The
Federal Reserve and the Obama administration have
prohibited additional lending practices, and required that
information be disclosed in ways that better affect consumer
behavior.4 °3
Another debt trap, payday lending, has attendant
costs.4 0 4 Payday lending, which is legal in most states, 40 5 is
uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and
unfair credit billing and credit card practices.").
401. Id. § 1639; see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, FTC FACTS FOR CONSUMERS,
HIGH-RATE, HIGH-FEE LOANS (HOEPA/SECTION 32 MORTGAGES) (2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/homes/real9.pdf.
402. Jeff Gelles, Consumer Watch: Disclosure Failed This Time, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Sept. 7, 2009, httpJ/www.philly.com/inquirer/columnists/jeff gelles/
20090927_ConsumerWatchDisclosurefailedthistime.html (quoting recent
survey by Prof. Jeff Sovern of ineffectiveness of TILA disclosure requirements);
see also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 38-43 (2008).
403. Will Credit Card Law Alter Consumers' Behavior?, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, May 22, 2009, http'J/www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=104426585. The Credit CARD Act of 2009, among other things, (i)
requires advance notice of rate increases and other significant changes as
determined by the Federal Reserve; (ii) places limits on interest rate, fee, and
finance charge increases applicable to outstanding credit card balances; (iii)
prohibits double-cycle billing and penalties for on-time payments; and (iv)
places restrictions on credit card solicitations to those under twenty-one years
old. H.R. 627, 111th Cong (2009). Those under twenty-one who seek to open a
credit card account must (i) have the signature of a cosigner, including the
parent, legal guardian, spouse, or any other individual over twenty years old
who has the means to repay the credit card debts or (ii) submit financial
information showing their independent means of repaying any obligation
arising from the proposed extension of credit. Id.
404. Typically a cash advance is made to a consumer in exchange for the
consumer's personal check, or the consumer's authorization to debit the
consumer's deposit account electronically. In either case, the consumer pays a
fee for the cash advance. On the due date, the consumer can repay the
obligation or further defer repayment of the advance. One study of the payday
lending industry found that ninety percent of its business comes from borrowers
who assume five or more loans per year, and over sixty percent of the business
comes from borrowers with twelve or more loans per year. URIAH KING &
LESLIE PARRISH, SPRINGING THE DEBT TRAP: RATE CAPS ARE ONLY PROVEN
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increasing: "Nationally, there are more than two payday
lending storefronts for every Starbucks location; in [twenty-
nine] of the [thirty-five] states with payday lending, payday
storefronts outnumber McDonald's restaurants."4°6 Congress
in 2006 capped the annual interest of payday loans to U.S.
military service members to a rate of thirty-six percent." 7
Borrowers generally renewed loans several times before
paying them off, a Defense Department study concluded, and
the resulting fees led to effective annual interest rates of 400
percent or more.40 8  The military had pushed for the law,
saying predatory payday loans saddled low-paid enlisted
soldiers with debts that ruined their finances, jeopardized
security clearances and undermined "troop readiness, morale,
and quality of life."40 9
As debt levels increase to fuel more consumption, so too
does the risk of inaccurate reporting of consumers' credit
history. Thus, another byzantine statutory framework,
PAYDAY LENDING REFORM, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 3 (2007),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lendinglresearch-analysis/springing-
the-debt-trap.pdf. One recent examination of payday lending found that
"'churning' of existing borrowers' loans every two weeks account[ed] for three-
fourths of all payday loan volume." LESLIE PARRISH & URIAH KING, PHANTOM
DEMAND: SHORT-TERM DUE DATE GENERATES NEED FOR REPEAT PAYDAY
LOANS, ACCOUNTING FOR 76% OF TOTAL VOLUME, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING 3 (2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-
analysis/phantom-demand-final.pdf. The Center for Responsible Lending found:
"This churning of loans to borrowers each pay period costs these households
$3.5 billion in extra fees each year." Id. at 4.
405. In thirty-five states, the annual interest rate is either unregulated or
over 100 percent. Consumer Federation of America, PayDay Loan Consumer
Information, Legal Status, httpJ/www.paydayloaninfo.org/legal.asp (last visited
Jan. 12, 2010). One calculation of the annual percentage rate for a two-week
$250 loan based on the legal maximum interest rate showed a range of 156
percent and 1955 percent for these thirty-five states. Id.
406. KING & PARRISH, supra note 404, at 5-6 (stating that the payday
lending industry has grown from around 500 locations in 1990 to over 22,000
locations across thirty-five states in 2009).
407. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007,
Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 670, 120 Stat. 2083, 2091 (2006); 32 C.F.R. § 232.4
(2008).
408. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES
DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS 13
(2006), httpJ/www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Report-to-Congress-final.pdf.
409. Id. at 45. The Defense Department reported that the "debt trap is the
rule, not the exception: the average borrower pays back $834 for a $339 loan."
Id. at 15. The thirty-six percent rate cap means lenders can charge no more
than $1.38 on a $100 loan for two weeks-an amount some payday lenders say
is too low to be profitable.
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namely the Fair Credit Reporting Act,41° seeks to help ensure
that the credit bureaus furnish correct and complete
information to businesses to use when evaluating credit
applications.
As consumers assume more debt, there exists a greater
likelihood of difficulties in repaying the principal, interest,
and financing fees. This gives rise to abusive debt collection
practices, which, in turn, has prompted statutory responses,
such as the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.41'
But the statutory measures generally do not seek to
curtail the output of debt. Many federal statutes, such as
TILA, still focus instead on mandatory disclosures, with the
assumption that rational self-interested consumers will
choose the best outcome.412
G. The Environmental Costs from Increased Consumption
As a governmental policy increasingly primes consumers
to pursue their self-interest, consumers will seek to minimize
the personal costs of their consumption. To accommodate
their desire (and further the governmental policy of increased
output), the government will not require that all the negative
externalities from production and consumption be
internalized in the cost of the goods and services.
Competition policy today generally strives to lower price
and increase output, not to ensure that all the costs from
production and consumption are internalized.413  These
negative externalities are left for other laws, if any. But the
growing externalities from consumption, noted the OECD,
have made many public goods (such as clean air, silence, clear
space, clean water, splendid views, and wildlife diversity)
"increasingly scarce."414 As a consequence, "[nlearly every
transaction of private goods carries an invisible cost, paid by
410. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2006).
411. Id. §§ 1692-1692p.
412. For a critique of this assumption see Susan Block-Lieb et al., Disclosure
as an Imperfect Means for Addressing Overindebtedness: An Empirical
Assessment of Comparative Approaches, in CONSUMER CREDIT, OVER-
INDEBTEDNESS AND BANKRUPTCY: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
(forthcoming 2009).
413. See, e.g., STRANGE & BAYLEY, supra note 213, at 79-80, 94-96
(discussing negative externalities).
414. Id. at 87.
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everyone through degraded public goods."415
As output for goods and services increases so too does the
demand for energy. For example, although the average
family size is fifteen percent smaller in 2001 than it was in
1970, the average home size is fifty-three percent larger.416
More energy is needed to cool and heat these larger homes
and keep their appliances working; not surprisingly, energy
consumption per person increased fifty-two percent between
1949 and 2008. 4' 7 With the increase in demand for energy, by
August 2008, the value of oil in the ground ($162,000 billion)
exceeded the combined total value of all equity ($52,300
billion) and debt markets ($67,000 billion)."
As demand for energy increases (primarily supplied
today by fossil fuels), 419 environmental externalities will also
increase.4 20  To accommodate bigger homes, real estate
development occurs further from cities and inner suburbs,
often without attention to public transport. 421 Aside from its
environmental toll, the longer commute affects the family's
social fabric. More people wake up earlier for longer
commutes from their bigger homes, which warehouse their
goods.422 Between 1990 and 2000, "the number departing
415. Id.
416. Louis Uchitelle, Economic View: Living in Denial, Comfortably, in a Big
Home, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2001, § 3 at 4. Home ownership has also increased.
In 1901, nineteen percent of Americans owned their home, while in
2002-2003, sixty-seven percent of U.S. families did. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, supra note 214, at 68. In 1901, the size of the average U.S. family
was 4.9 people; by 2002-2003, it was 2.5. Reflections,
http://www.bls.gov/opub/uscs/reflections.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
417. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 13 tbl.1.5 (2009)
(increasing from 214 million to 327 million British Thermal Units (btu)),
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/aer.pdf
418. Krishna Guha, Two Challenges Highlight the Scale of the Bonanza, FIN.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 2008, at 4, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/49b6fTfc-
673a-1 ldd-808f-0000779fd18c.html?nclickcheck= 1.
419. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 417, at xix fig.4.
420. Between 1949 and 2006, for example, the amount of CO 2 emissions from
the residential sector increased from 320.6 million metric tons to 1197.9 million
metric tons. U.S. Historical Data Series, Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide
Emissions from the Residential and Commercial Sectors, by Fuel Type, 1949-
2007, www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/excel/historical-co2.xls (last visited Feb.
7, 2010).
421. Bradford McKee, As Suburbs Grow, So Do Waistlines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4, 2003, httpJ/www.nytimes.com/2003/09/04/garden/as-suburbs-grow-so-do-
waistlines.html?sec=health.
422. The mean travel time, according to the U.S. Census, increased from
21.7 minutes (1980) to 22.4 minutes (1990) to 25.5 minutes (2000). Travel
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from [twelve] midnight to 6:29 a.m. rose by nearly 4.8 million
people, and increased from [eighteen] percent to [twenty]
percent of the total."4 23
As output increases, society must dispose of the increase
in waste-including goods poorly made or once-fashionable.
As Bauman observed: "Liquid modernity is a civilization of
excess, redundancy, waste, and waste disposal." 424  Between
1960 and 2007, the amount of solid waste increased from 2.68
to 4.62 pounds per person per day.425 Residential waste is
estimated to comprise between fifty-five percent and sixty-
five percent of total municipal solid waste generation.4 26
This increase in waste from increased consumption also
has an environment toll. "By cutting the amount of waste we
generate back to 1990 levels," estimated the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, "we could reduce
greenhouse gas emissions by [eighteen] million metric tons of
carbon equivalent (MMTCE), the basic unit of measure for
greenhouse gases."427 Recycling is not the sole solution. The
Time to Work for the United States: 1990 and 1980 Census,
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/journey/ustime.txt (last visited Jan.
1, 2010); see also CLARA RESCHOVSKY, UNITED STATES CENSUS
BUREAU, JOURNEY TO WORK: 2000, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF 5 (2004),
http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/c2kbr-33.pdf (last visited Jan. 1, 2010)
("The proportions of trips in categories below [twenty] minutes all declined
between 1990 and 2000, while the proportions in the categories of [twenty-five]
minutes or more all increased. The proportion in the category [ninety] or more
minutes nearly doubled, from 1.6 percent to 2.8 percent.").
423. RESCHOVSKY, supra note 422, at 6.
424. BAUMAN, supra note 298, at 185.
425. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, MUNICIPAL
SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 FACTS AND FIGURES 5 (2008),
available at http://www.epa.gov/waste/nonhaz/municipal/pubs/msw07-rpt.pdf.
Fortunately 33.4 percent of waste in 2007 was recovered through recycling
leaving 137 million tons discarded in landfills-fifty-four percent of all
municipal solid waste. Id. at 3.
426. Id. at 11.
427. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND WASTE,
REDUCING WASTE CAN MAKE A DIFFERENCE 2, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/wycdlwaste/downloadscc-waste.pdf. The EPA estimates that:
[I]ncreasing our national recycling rate from [thirty percent] in 2000 to
[thirty-five percent] would reduce greenhouse gas emissions by another
[ten] MMTCE, compared to landfilling the same material. Together,
these levels of waste prevention and recycling would be comparable to
annual emissions from the electricity consumption of nearly 4.9 million
households.
Id. Waste reduction also "allow[s] more trees to remain standing in the forest,
where they can continue to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere" and
store the carbon, in a process called "carbon sequestration." Id. at 2.
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EPA found that preventing waste in the first place reduces
emissions (i) from energy consumption, (ii) from incinerators,
(iii) of methane from landfills, and (iv) of greenhouse gas from
the combustion of waste.428
The attendant costs of increased output will accelerate as
consumption for discretionary goods and services accelerates
in developing countries like China and India.4 29  If a
developed nation (like the United States) actively promotes
increased consumption of goods and services, it cannot
plausibly pressure developing countries' residents to curb
their consumption.
H. Self-Interested Citizens' Disinterest in Public Goods
One might question the desirability of a governmental
policy to accelerate private consumption, especially as
investments in public goods such as education, roads,
infrastructure, and alternative energy lag. But a government
policy that promotes both self-interest and private
consumption forms a toxic cocktail. This policy will increase
the risk of negative externalities from (and subsidization of)
private consumption, and also create a disinvestment in
public goods.
Under neoclassical economic theory, self-interested
citizens have little incentive to invest in public goods and will
free ride whenever possible.43 ° They simply respond: "What's
428. Id. ("When people reuse things or when products are made with less
material, less energy is needed to extract, transport, and process raw materials
and to manufacture products. The payoff? When energy demand decreases,
fewer fossil fuels are burned and less carbon dioxide is emitted to the
atmosphere.").
429. See, e.g., Strength by Luxury Goods Shoppers in Asia and Online Bring
Glimmers of Hope to Beleagured Industry, Says Bain & Company in Release
of Annual Worldwide Market Study, REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS107473+21-Oct-
2009+BW20091021 (projecting a twelve-percent year-over-year increase in
luxury good sales in 2009 in mainland China, and projected sales growth in
China, South Asia and Central Asia may cause Asia to overtake Europe and the
Americas as the largest global luxury market region).
430. See, e.g., John J. Flynn, The 'Is' and 'Ought' of Vertical Restraints After
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1095, 1132
(1986) (discussing flaws of neoclassical economic theory); cf. Marina Lao, Free
Riding: An Overstated, and Unconvincing, Explanation for Resale Price
Maintenance, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK 199-202
(Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (discussing limitations of theory with respect to
RPM). Of course, some free riding exists (think public radio). So economists
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in it for me?" If the free market is equated with promoting
individual self-interest, then increased governmental
spending on many public goods will often be seen as inferior
to private consumption. 431  In pursuing their self-interest,
consumers will often place a greater value on personal
consumption. The perceived benefit of a new $1000 stereo,
for example, is often more tangible, immediate, and of greater
personal value than the perceived benefit from a public good.
People who are childless or who send their children to private
schools benefit indirectly from investments in the public
school (perhaps by higher real estate values). Additionally,
attitudes toward taxes will shift. Indeed, the political
rhetoric over the past thirty years touts how lower taxes
improve welfare as consumers can consume more-accruing
the full benefit for each dollar spent on personal consumption
instead of a small benefit, if at all, from investments in public
goods. Thus the push is to divert spending on these public
goods by lowering taxes and thereby increase private
consumption.
I. Our Species' Survival Depends Upon Cooperation and
Ability to Look Beyond Narrow Self-Interest
One implication of the behavioral economic literature is
that a social policy that promotes the perception that its
citizens are self-interested can be self-defeating. As Fehr and
Fischbacher conclude from their behavioral studies, the
problem is not inherent selfishness, but rather the perception
of how widespread selfishness is: "if people believe that
cheating on taxes, corruption, or abuses of the welfare state
are widespread, they themselves are more likely to cheat on
taxes, take bribes, or abuse welfare state institutions."4 32 A
and neuroscientists are employing neurotechnology to have test subjects
truthfully reveal how much they value a public good. Scientists Develop Novel
Use of Neurotechnology to Solve Classic Social Problem, SCI. DAILY, Sept. 11,
2009, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/09/090910142358.htm.
431. GALBRAITH, supra note 288, at 111.
432. Fehr & Fischbacher, supra note 109, at 167. For example, in 1995 the
Minnesota Department of Revenue tested several ways to increase its residents'
voluntary compliance with the state individual income tax. STEPHEN COLEMAN,
THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT STATE TAX
RESULTS, MINNESOTA DEP'T OF REVENUE 1 (1996), available at
http.Avww.taxes.state.mn.us/legal-policy/research-reports/content/complnce.pdf.
It mailed taxpayers different information on the importance of voluntary
compliance. Id. Letter 1, mailed to about 20,000 taxpayers, made a rational
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study of more than 5000 business (mostly MBA) and
nonbusiness graduate students at U.S. and Canadian colleges
and universities during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004
academic years found that graduate business students cheat
more than their nonbusiness-student peers. The students'
perception that their peers were cheating had the largest
influence in their behavior. 43
Thus the behavioral economics experiments' larger
implication is in preventing society's perception of civic duties
as unraveling; once the conditional cooperators perceive
others as acting selfishly, they too will act selfishly. Any
social policy should discourage, rather than encourage, the
assumption that most people act selfishly, and instead
emphasize that others are cooperating in their civic duties.
This is important as the Internet and global commerce
over the past twenty years have broadened social
relationships and increased the interdependence of citizens
throughout the world. As the financial crisis shows, economic
risks are not isolated to particular regions.434  Because
individuals take part in events on a worldwide scale,
argument for paying taxes ('[mour income tax dollars are spent on services
that we Minnesotans depend on. Over [thirty] percent of state taxes go to
support education. Another [eighteen] percent is spent on health care and
support for the elderly and the needy. Local governments get about [twelve]
percent of the state tax money, supporting services in your community such as
law enforcement, parks, libraries and snow removal. ... So when taxpayers do
not pay what they owe, the entire community suffers.'" (ellipses in original)).
Id. at 5. Letter 2 appealed to a social norm about tax compliance, namely that
the overwhelming majority accurately report the income taxes they owe:
According to a recent public opinion survey, many Minnesotans believe
other people routinely cheat on their taxes. This is not true, however.
Audits by the Internal Revenue Service show that people who file tax
returns report correctly and pay voluntarily [ninety-three] percent of
the income taxes they owe. Most taxpayers file their returns
accurately and on time. Although some taxpayers owe money because
of minor errors, a small number of taxpayers who deliberately cheat
owe the bulk of unpaid taxes.
Id. at 5-6. Letter 1 did not affect compliance, while Letter 2 had a 'moderately
significant effect on the entire sample and a stronger effect within a large
subgroup of taxpayers." Id. at 18.
433. Donald L. McCabe et al., Academic Dishonesty in Graduate Business
Programs: Prevalence, Causes, and Proposed Action, 5 ACAD. MGMT. LEARNING
& EDUC. 294 (2006), available at ftpJ/ftp.cba.uri.edu/Classes/Beauvais/MBA540/
Readings/McCabe_2006.pdfo
434. POSNER, supra note 24, at 55 (noting how a neglected downside of
distributing risk of mortgages through securitization is that risk is spread to
otherwise safe markets).
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individual "self-realization cannot be the supreme principle of
ethics."4 35  To evolve, economies must rely on complex, large-
scale cooperation.
This relationship between cooperation and market
integration became apparent in an Ultimatum Game
experiment in fifteen small-scale economies from twelve
countries on four continents.436 None of the societies behaved
like self-interested maximizers. But the researchers found
that the range of offers varied more amongst members of
these small-scale economies than did the range of offers by
university students. The differences among societies in
"market integration" and "cooperation in production"
explained a substantial portion of the behavioral variation
among the different economies: "The higher the degree of
market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation,
the greater the level of cooperation and sharing in
experimental games."437 Moreover, "the nature and degree of
cooperation and punishment in the experiments," they found,
were "generally consistent with economic patterns of
everyday life in these societies. In a number of cases, the
parallels between experimental game play and the structure
of daily life were quite striking. "431
Likewise, in reviewing the traits that appear with
regularity in the cultures of high-performing and adaptive
companies, a senior advisor to McKinsey & Co. identified ten
435. BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 622
(Routeledge Classics 2004) (1946); Pope John XXIII, supra note 357, at 94.
436. Gintis et al., supra note 91, at 158.
437. Id. The societies were rank-ordered in five categories-"market
integration" (how often people buy and sell, or work for a wage), "cooperation in
production" (whether production collective or individual), plus "anonymity" (how
prevalent anonymous roles and transactions are), "privacy" (how easily can
people keep their activities secret), and "complexity" (how much centralized
decision-making occurs above the level of the household). Id. Using statistical
regression analysis, only the first two characteristics, market integration and
cooperation in production, were significant. Id.
438. Id. at 159; see also BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL
CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 79-102 (2005) (noting that whenever
America was mired in economic stagnation its democratic values stagnated as
well). Hostility toward immigrants, the poor, and other competing groups,
whether by nationality, religion, race, or gender, increased as these groups were
seemingly threatened by others stealing their fixed, or dwindling, share of the
pie. Id. In contrast, during periods of economic growth, our society slowly
progressed from this zero-sum mentality toward openness, mobility, and
democracy. Id.
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illustrative performing, cooperating, and innovating norms.439
These coincide with religious and ethical norms involving
respect and reciprocity (for example, do unto others as you
would have them do unto you), honesty, and trust."0 All
other routines of human cohabitation, norms and rules are
"footnotes to that precept."" 1
CONCLUSION
Sophocles said "he drew men as they ought to be, and
Euripides as they were."" 2  The neoclassical economic
theories' assumption of self-interest represents neither how
we ought to act nor how we actually act. The assumption is
not descriptive, as many people look beyond their self-
interest. Nor is it normative. Given the importance of trust,
markets work as well, if not better, if people have compassion
and empathy, are altruistic and cooperate even when not in
their economic interest. "Without [these] prosocial emotions,
we would all be sociopaths, and human society would not
exist, however strong the institutions of contract,
governmental law enforcement, and reputation."" 3 Rather
than make markets more efficient, self-interest at times leads
to sub-optimal economic outcomes.
This article does not call for socialism or collectivism.
Residents of communist countries were among the unhappiest
lot.444  Nor does this article call for the end of marketing,
debt, or zero-sum competition. Many law schools are prime
examples of zero-sum competition-one school's (or student's)
advancement in rank, means another school's (or student's)
decline in rank. Status competition is not normatively bad,
but is misdirected. Some people, for example, voluntarily
439. BEINHOCKER, supra note 78, at 370-71.
440. Not surprisingly, the larger religions emphasize pro-social norms-
helping's one's neighbor, turning the other cheek. Gintis et al., supra note 93,
at 30; BAUMAN, supra note 298, at 32-33 ("Accepting the precept of loving one's
neighbor is the birth-act of humanity."). The early Christians, for example,
were remarkable in owning everything in common, selling their goods and
possessions and distributing the proceeds among themselves according to what
each one needed, and sharing their food "gladly and generously." Acts of
Apostles 2:44-47.
441. BAUMAN, supra note 298, at 33.
442. ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC AND THE POETIcS 261 (Modern Library
1984).
443. Bowles & Gintis, supra note 121, at 433.
444. LAYARD, supra note 211, at 32-33.
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compete (and use Internet peer pressure) to alter their energy
consumption, driving, and exercise habits. 445  Nor should
government policies necessarily curtail output, especially
when many throughout the world are malnourished, sick, and
lack adequate water supplies and other necessities.
Instead, this article seeks to identify the risks as
governmental policies advocate increases in output and self-
interest as invariably good. No doubt policymakers at times
can assume the worst, and ask what would happen if its
citizens acted selfishly as neoclassical economic theory
predicts. But even here, care is needed. If the government
assumes its citizens solely pursue their self-interest, its
policies may signal distrust or actually promote widespread
self-interest, leading to suboptimal results (such as citizens
shirking their civic duties by free riding or cheating). In no
event should the government actively promote self-interested
behavior. While "no change of system or machinery can avert
those causes of social malaise which consist in the egotism,
greed, or quarrelsomeness of human nature," wrote R.H.
Tawney, "what it can do is to create an environment in which
those are not the qualities which are encouraged."446
Thus a governmental policy that assumes self-interested
citizens is misguided. It ignores how moral, ethical, and
social norms hinder undesirable conduct and promote
desirable behavior-at times more effectively than financial
incentives and penalties.447 In understanding the drivers of
behavior beyond the simplistic assumption of wealth-
maximization, policymakers can better understand how
informal social norms can promote the desired objectives.
Money, at times, is an inefficient mechanism to motivate,
noted behavioral economist Dan Ariely. "Social norms are not
only cheaper, but often more effective as well."448
Nor is increased output always beneficial. Economic
activity's proper place should always remain "as the servant,
445. Tim Bradshaw, Peer Groups that Harness an Online Community Spirit,
FIN. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009, at 12.
446. TAWNEY, supra note 351, at 180.
447. Gintis et al., supra note 93, at 4 (noting how effective social policies are
"those that support socially valued outcomes not only by harnessing selfish
motives to socially valued ends, but also by evoking, cultivating, and
empowering public-spirited motives").
448. ARIELY, supra note 78, at 86.
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not the master, of society."449 Consequently, improved social
conditions for all citizens must accompany economic
development. The economics professor Simon Kuznets
warned of the shortcomings in using his GDP measure to
infer a nation's welfare. Thus, government officials must
develop better tools to determine whether its (in)actions have
the desired effect.45 °
Competition policy's greatest failing has been its failure
to understand better how competition works in particular
markets in particular communities at particular time periods
and the interplay among private institutions, government
institutions, and informal social, ethical, and moral norms.
By undertaking more empirical research, competition
authorities will better understand the dynamics of particular
markets and how legal and informal norms interact to
influence individual behavior and competition generally.
William Kovacic, among others, has long called for more
empirically-driven research policies.45' Ultimately, we should
reorient our social policies to reach Keynes's promised land,
and to return to some of the most sure and certain principles
of religion and traditional virtue-that avarice is a vice, that
the exaction of usury is a misdemeanor, and the love of money
is detestable, that those walk most truly in the paths of virtue
449. TAWNEY, supra note 351, at 183.
450. On a positive note, the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi commission examined "how
to improve standard GDP; how to incorporate new measures of economic, social,
and environmental sustainability into the data; and how to devise fresh
indicators for assessing quality of life." John Thornhill, A Measure Remodelled,
FIN. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at 9, available at http://www.ft.con/cms/s/0/
243c94da-ecdc-lldd-a534-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=l; see REPORT BY
THE COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND
SOCIAL PROGRESS (2009), http'//www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport-
anglais.pdf; see also Joseph Stiglitz, Progress, What Progress?, OECD
OBSERVER, Apr. 2009, at 27, available at http://www.oecdobserver.org'news/
fullstory.php/aid/2793/Progress,_what~progress_.html.
451. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What
Constitutes Good Performance?, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 922 (2009)
("Investments in knowledge have long-term capital qualities. Investments in
activities-research, workshops, partnerships with academia-that build
knowledge help ensure that the agency stays abreast of important developments
in economic theory, empirical study, and legal analysis. Among other
applications, this knowledge-building is a crucial element of effective case
selection. A superior knowledge base increases the agency's ability to attempt
more complex and demanding matters, helps the agency ground its cases in the
best possible conceptual and empirical foundations, and provides assurance that
the agency will not find itself trapped in the wrong analytical model.").
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and sane wisdom who take least thought for the morrow. We
shall once more value ends above means and prefer the good
to the useful. "We shall honour those who can teach us how
to pluck the hour and the day virtuously and well, the
delightful people who are capable of taking direct enjoyments
in things, the lilies of the field who toil not, neither do they
spin."452
Self-interested behavior does not necessarily yield a
happier, healthier society. The financial crisis can provide
the needed impetus to look beyond the current toils and
invest in a better competition policy for future generations.
452. KEYNES, supra note 263, at 372.
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